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This dissertation explores the effects of the Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual
Property Rights Agreement ('the TRIPs Agreement') on developing countries with
particular emphasis on the pharmaceutical industry. The methodology used is that
of analysing secondary materials. India and South Africa are used as 'case studies '
in order to assess these effects. Before TRIPs, there was widespread piracy,
copying and free riding of intellectual property rights in developing countries. The
producers of the pirated and copied goods were mainly from developed countries
and they were losing profits by the billions . The United States decided to demand
for increased international property rights under the auspices of WTO. After eight
years of negotiations, the TRIPs Agreement was signed by all member countries of
the WTO.
The blatant piracy of intellectual property is obviously wrong and should be
prohibited. Therefore the need for increased of intellectual property protection
through TRIPs is understandable. However a problem arises is in the
pharmaceutical industry; due to increased patent protection , pharmaceutical
products and process will become more expensive than they were in developing
countries before TRIPs. The effect is that new drugs are inaccessible to the poor
citizens of developing countries. This dissertation reaches a conclusion on how a
balance is going to be achieved between the contrasting needs for legitimate
intellectual protection and access pharmaceutical products .
India had a flourishing generic industry before TRIPs. The effect of the Agreement
will be to wipe a high percentage ofthis industry out of business . However a
research-based industry may develop due to increased patent protection.
The South African Government introduced drastic measures in 1997 in an attempt
to provide cheap drugs for its dying AIDS patients. A number of international
pharmaceutical manufacturing companies brought an action against South Africa
claiming that this legislation, the Medicines and Related Substances Control
2
Amendment Act 1997, was not compatible with TRIPs. This dispute ended abruptly
with the pharmaceutical companies dropping the case due to international pressure.
The outcome ofthis dispute has encouraged other developing countries to adopt
similar legislations. The South African dispute was mainly concerned with the
compulsory licensing provisions in TRIPs. These provisions put developing
countries in a very difficult position. The outcome of the dispute may encourage
other developing countries to challenge the other provisions in TRIPs which most
adversely affect them.
The conclusion reached is that developing countries will experience both negative
and positive effects ~n the implementation of TRIPs. However, these effects cannot
be assessed accurately before 2005 when the transition period for the
implementation of TRIPs in developing countries expires. On the whole it seems
that the negative effects will out-way any positive effects. However, if some
provisions of TRIPs such as the compulsory licensing provisions are amended to
better suit developing countries, TRIPs may well be beneficial to developing
countries in the long run. The negative effects of TRIPs will be easier to deal with
if the implementation and long-term application of the Agreement is surrounded by
a climate of cooperation and understanding between developed and developing
countries. It is through this cooperation that the developed and developing countries
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The provisions found in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
. Agreement ('the TRIPs Agreement') , are the most detailed set of provisions; found in
one document, granting international protection of intellectual property rights. They
provide the widest international intellectual property protection ever and are the only
single set of rules on international intellectual property to be ratified by so many
countries.I The negotiations leading to this agreement were very heated with countries
from the developing world having the completely opposite view to the one held by
countries from the industrialised world. This divide came to be famously referred to
as the north-south divide. The countries from the north being the developed countries
while those from the south being the developing countries.
The bone of contention between the two sides is quite simple to express. The
countries from the north (led by the United States) wanted greater intellectual
property.protection under the auspices of World Trade Organisation (WTO) with a
strong enforcement mechanism, which was not found in the already existing
international conventions under WIPO. The countries from the southern block such as
India, Nigeria , Brazil, Argentina and Colombia did not like the idea of intellectual
property being viewed as a trade issue (thus coming under the auspices of WTO) and
did not want an all-encompassing agreement granting stronger international
intellectual property protection. According to their view the already existing




international conventions were enough to protect international intellectual property
rights.
Why did the countries from the North want greater intellectual property protection?
The main concern was the volume of piracy, copying and free riding in violation of
the intellectual property rights concerned. These intellectual property rights tended to
belong to companies from the industrialised world, which were losing money by the
billions . 'The United States International Trade Commission estimated that the United
States corporations were victims of foreign intellectual piracy on a tremendous scale,
between $40 and $60 billion per year". The developing countries did not want
increased intellectual property protection because they claimed that it would mean
little or no technological transfer to their countries , indigenous industries would not
developed in the face of more sophisticated protected goods form western industries
and the effect of TRIPs would be to keep the south dependant on the north.
Developing countries are divided into two categories; the less developed countries
(LDCs)3 and the more developed countries (MDCst Due to the fact that the MDCs
are much more developed than the LDCs, TRIPs will affect the LDCs more adversely
than the MDCs. Although the MDCs will also be affected by some of the effects of
TRIPs highlighted, the LDCs are the main focus of this dissertation.
2 USITC (I 998), as cited in J, Boyle . . Shamans. Software and Spleen: Law and the Construction ofthe
Information Society.
3 These countries include Kenya, India, Nigeria and South Africa.































It is plain to see why the blatant copying of such commodities as compact discs and
videos , the making of fake Rolex watches and low quality French perfumes is wrong,
and should be stopped by the introduction of stricter international intellectual property
laws. However the question is completely different when it comes to the
pharmaceutical industry. The granting of patents for pharmaceutical products means
that the cheap copied drugs, which, developing countries relied on, would be illegal to
produce and they would have to buy expensive patented drugs. The big dilemma here
is how to ensure that drugs are affordable for all people in all nations of the world and
at the same time have laws, which prohibit the copying of these drugs giving
pharmaceutical companies rights that will encourage them to invest in the crucial
business of research for new drugs. Before the TRIPs agreement almost all the
developing countries, which had any intellectual property protection, did not accord
patent protection to the pharmaceutical industry. This is with the exception of South
Africa which had strict intellectual property rights for almost all industries With the
introduction of TRIPs these countries have no choice but to implement patent laws
which protect goods produced and processes used in all industries including the
pharmaceutical industry. The aim of this dissertation is to assess the effect on
developing countries of the provisions in TRIPs concerning patents for
pharmaceutical products and processes.
It is frequently argued by critics that TRIPs was imposed on the Third World by the
United States. This criticism is well founded and is discussed in chapter one. Chapter
one also discusses the important relationship between intellectual property and the






































In a general manner the positive and negative effects of patent protection In
developing countries as well as the theoretical problem of forcing western style
intellectual property rights in developing countries. The topic in chapter three is the
effects of the patent provisions on India. India is the perfect example of a developing
country, which may be adversely affected by the patent provisions in TRIPs. Before
TRIPs India had a flourishing pharmaceutical industry which relied on weak
intellectual property law to produce cheap generic drugs both for export and for
internal sell. India stands out as the developing country that was most vocally opposed
to TRIPs. It had every reason to fear extremely negative effects on its countries
pharmaceutical industry. Chapter four focuses on the recent case in South Africa in
which South Africa was accused of contravening TRIPs by the introduction of its
1997 Medicines Act. The events leading to this dispute and its outcome are of great
relevance to this dissertation and are a good illustration of TRIPs at work in a













1.1 Intellectual property rights and their relation to pharmaceutical
drugs.
'Without patents the AIDS drugs would not exist '
The Economist Print Edition, A war over and patents, March 2001
When someone invents a new method of doing something, creates a new song, writes
a new book, discovers or makes a new drug or discovers or comes up with new useful
information he would want legal protection for this invention or information so that he
can exploit it to his benefit. This protection would be in from of a property right
granted to the inventor or creator so that others may not copy, sell or reproduce it
without his permission. Such a property right is referred to as an intellectual property
right. These rights are typically embodied in laws regarding patents , copyrights,
trademarks, trade secrets and designs. The term also refers to new forms of creativity
such as computer software , integrated circuits and future technological advances.'
Patents are the specific form of intellectual property that may provide protection
where pharmaceutical drugs are concerned. 'A patent is a legally enforceable right






























granted by virtue of a law to a person to exclude, for a limited time, others from
certain acts in relation to a described new invention"
These 'certain acts ' are
'a) when the patent has been granted in respect of a product:
i) making, importing, offering for sale, selling and using, the products
ii) stoking , such product for the purposes of offering for sale, selling, or using,
b) when the patent has been granted in respect of a process.
i) applying the process
ii) doing any of the acts referred to in a) above in respect of a product obtained
directly by means of the process."
Thus what is patented in a particular drug is the drug itself and the process of making
the drug which a particular person has come up with after exerting himself mentally
and financially. Thus the monopoly granted covers the production, distribution and
utilisation of the product and process
So why have such sweeping protection for inventions? The first argument in favour of
patents has been that patents are an incentive to create. Lockean theory indicates that
' property should inhere in the act of creation because that was how one would provide
incentives to create. When innovators are allowed to retain rights to the output of
innovative effort, they will have the incentive to devote their creative resources to
developing innovations. Well-defined property rights foster productive behaviour
such as investment and innovation 's.
6 UN Secretariat, The Role of Patents in the transfer oftechnology to Developing Countr ies (United Nations
Publications) sa les No .65.11.B.1, New York , 1964
7BPRI, Model Lawf or Developing Countries on Invention (Geneva, 1965) Section 21



























Patents are also a means for the creator to recoup the investment he has put in creating
the particular drug. In the pharmaceutical industry this kind of incentive is very
necessary. There is a common claim that without this incentive many drugs that are
used today would not have been researched and manufactured. They would simply not
exist. In addition to this there is the argument that the granting of patent rights has
been due to a 'compromise deriving from the recognition that many inventions are
both 'free ' goods and public goods. An invention is a 'free' item in the sense that,
once made, its use involves no costs other than those of communicating the
knowledge and learning how to use it. Yet the invention can also be a 'public' good
i.e. an item whose costs of imitation are so small in relation to the costs of invention .
that unless an inventor has special safeguards he will not be able to enjoy the returns
from his idea. Patents try to compromise these two conflicting attributes of inventions
by providing special safeguards to the inventors for a number of years and then
nothing thereafter,9. In a nutshell the two reasons why patens are important is firstly
for the inventor to recover the costs of the research and development and 'secondly
the added productivity that such incentives to attain information monopoly rights will
creater" It is obviously in the public interest that research, new products and new
information are the consequences of patent protection
Firms in the pharmaceutical industry make extensive use of patent systems when
available. Because pharmaceutical products are very expensive to research and
9 W.R.Cornish, The International Relations ofIntellectual Property, [1993] 52(1), C.L.J, p. 50


















manufacture and yet very easy to copy, patents to protect the results of pharmaceutical
research and development (R&D) are very important. ' In 1990 it was estimated that it
costs U.S $212 million and takes 12 years on average to develop a new
pharmaceutical" I. R&D managers in 130 lines of business were asked to rate the
effectiveness of patents, secrecy or lead-time for protecting R&D results . 'On average
the pharmaceutical industry R&D project managers found patents more valuable for,
protecting the results ofR&D,12. It has been argued that the pharmaceutical industry
is one of the few industries for which patents constitute the main instrument for
protecting intellectual property. Most industrialised countries now provide patent
protection for pharmaceuticals. 'Notably however, this is mostly a recent development
with many of these industrialised nations only beginning to provide patent protection
for pharmaceutical industry in the last 20 to 40 years ' 13.
However one of the problems of patent protection, in relation to developing nations, is
that patent licence prices are not just about recouping investment, they are about
profits. 'In the USA, private enterprise is at the forefront of R&D because it has seen
it as profitable and not for the good of humankind. ' 14 This is the reason why patent
protection is commonly associated with price increase. It is for this reason that the
implementation of the TRIPs Agreement holds many disadvantages for developing
countries. Before analysing the various arguments on the costs of greater patent
protection in developing countries a general background to TRIPs is important.
II E,Henderson. TRiPs and the Third World: The Example of pharmaceutical patents in India, [1997],
19(11) E.I.P.R, obtained form wcstlaw, p. 13
12 Richard T. Rapp , Richard P. Rozer. Benefits and Costs ofIntellectual Property Protection in Developing
Countries, [1990] JWT 75 p. 87.
13 E,Henderson . TRiPs and the Third World: The Example ofpharmaceutical patents in India, [1997],
19(11) E.I.P.R, obtained from westiaw, p.14.
14 M, McGrath. The patent prov isions in TRiPs: Protecting Reasonable Remuneration for Services Rendered







1.2 GATT, World Trade Organisation and TRIPs
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) !5 was establishment in January
1948 to regulate and, expand international trade through the reduction of tariff barriers
and other measures in support of trade liberalisation. From 1948 to 1994, inter-
governmental meetings under GAIT's auspices to further trade liberalization took
place through a series of multilateral trade negotiations known as trade rounds. It was
agreed that instead of organising negotiations on single issues, there should be a
package approach covering a whole series of topics . As a result these trade rounds
normally took and still take several years to complete. Thus the Tokyo round of the
1970's took 6 years and the Uruguay round which begun in 1986 took 8 years .It was
not resolved until April 1994 when the Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade negotiations was signed in Marrakech,
Morocco, by 125 governments. These are the negotiations during which the TRIPs
Agreement was discussed and the WTO established.
Before the Uruguay round GATT had dealt only with merchandise goods . 'The
Uruguay Round differed from previous rounds in that the agenda was extended to
embrace new areas such as trade in services and intellectual property rights.
15 GAIT was meant to be a provisional arrangement that would be replaced by an Internat ional Trade
Organis ational (ITO). . A draft agreement for the ITO , known as the Havana Charter was agreed by more
than 50 countries including all 23 founding members of GAIT in March 1948. However, an insufficient
































According to the WTO, the Uruguay Round was the biggest negotiation mandate on
. trade ever agreed and ministers gave themselves four years to complete it'16 Iii. the
event, this four year estimation proved to be an under - estimation.. The negotiations
took eight years because of the complicated and often controversial, nature of many of
the areas covered. It has been claimed by various authors and participants'" of the
round that the negotiations on the TRIPs Agreement were the most controversial.
The Final Act is a voluminous document that includes the Agreement establishing the
WTO and the following multilateral agreements, which are binding on all contracting
parties to the Final Act and on the future members of the WTO,
• The Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights;
• The Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods; and
• The General Agreement on Trade in services
1.2.1 USA's involvement in TRIPs
'The TRIPs Agreement has been castigated by developing country
propagandists as neo-colonialism. Its unfortunate chronological juxtaposition
with section 301 of the U.S Trade Law has reinforced this view.'
Michael Blakeney, Intellectual Property and Economic Development I.T,L.R
[1998],1 p.2
In discussing the history of TRIPs there is no way to avoid a discussion on the
involvement of USA in making sure that intellectual property rights were included
16 D.Gervais, The TRIPs Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, p. 12
17 1. Watal, The TRIPs and Developing Countries-Strong, Weak or Balanced. (1997) I, 1.W.I.P, pp. 281-307.
Jayashrpe Watal worked in the Government ofIndia and was responsible for the TRIPs negotiations form





































under the auspices of GAIT. It is not far fetched to say that without the efforts that
USA made to this end there would probably be no TRIPs today, at least not under the
WTO. Historically, the protection of Intellectual Property Rights had been reserved to
the domain of national governments and international organisations such as World
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and the United Nations Educational
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). Established in 1976, WIPO is a
specialised U.N agency whose primary mission is to administer international treaties
on intellectual property. WIPO administers the Paris Convention for the protection of
industrial property and the Berne Convention for the protection of literary and artistic
works .
The mam reason why the USA wanted increased intellectual property protection
under GAIT lies in the fact that ' WIPO does not have any enforcement or dispute
settlement mechanisms apart from the treaties it administers. The provisions ensuring
compliance in the two treaties are very weak. 'Although both conventions permit
signatories to seek dispute resolution by the International Court of Justice, members
are also not bound to go to the Court ,1 8. GAIT had an effective dispute resolution
system and there was the possibility of applying trade sanctions on a non-complying
member. The USA took the position that ' tying obligations to protect intellectual
property rights to other trade commitments under GATT would provide the desired
vehicle for pressuring recalcitrant trading partners' 19. To illustrate just how opposed
developing countries were to having increased intellectual property protection, there is
.
evidence that before the TRIPs agreement many developing countries wanted what
























the industrialised countries termed as weak intellectual property rules in the Paris and
Berne Conventions to be made weaker. 'Agitation by developing countries within the
Berne and Paris unions to soften some of the perceived rigours of the international
intellectual property regime was signally unsuccessful. The TRIPs Agreement may be
regarded as the final defeat of this ameliorations campaigri"
The United States was compelled to demand for increased intellectual property
protection due to the great losses its companies were making abroad . The relative
percentage of US export with a high intellectual property content rose form 9.9% in
1947 to 27.4% in 198621. This phenomenon is often attributed to two major
technological revolutions in information technology (IT) i.e., the new electronic
information-processing and communications technologies and the new
biotechnologies. 'Both of these have multiple industrial applications, and many large
powerful corporations involved in such sectors as computers, telecommunication,
health, entertainment, financial services , retailing, chemicals, agriculture and food,
embraced these technologies. ,22
However these corporations are vulnerable in that the cost of researching and
developing versions of software packages, CDs and drugs tend to be very high while
the cost of copying them is extremely low. Thus rival producers can make multiple
copies of the products very cheaply. In developing countries where laws for protection
20 B. Sodipo, Piracy and Counterfeiting, GATT, TRIPs, and Developing Countries , [1998] E.I.P .R ,5,
P.197















of intellectual property rights were weak or non-existent, counterfeiters could quickly
and inexpensively copy these products and sell them at home and abroad. In the
pharmaceutical industry, drug companies which have carried out time consuming and
expensive research and development to create new products had their medicines
reverse engineered, manufactured and sold at lower prices by other firms. India was
world renowned for this. Based on these figures , the IIPA stressed that 'the U.S.
government's goal must be to establish an international trading climate in which
intellectual property is respected and protected '<. From the early and mid 80s the US
government received pressure form its industries to use its domestic law as well as
international law to assure protection in foreign markets. Due to the highly effective
lobbying of the affected corporations'" United States lead an effort within GAIT to
establish a framework to regulate trade in counterfeit goods.
The United State's position was that tying obligations to protect intellectual property
rights to other trade commitments under GAIT would provide the desired vehicle for
pressuring non-compliant trading partners. So having recruited support from other
developed nations, 1985 to 1989 saw the United States employing various methods to
encourage developing countries to accept the insertion of TRIPs into GAIT. These
included bilateral actions using its Trade Act (1988) Super 301 measures to impose
sanctions and tariffs on imported goods from countries considered to have weak IPR
laws25. Trade sanctions by a powerful and wealthy nation such as the United States
are potentially crippling for less developed countries. For example ' in 1992 the United
23 T.P Stewart .The GATT Uruguay round: A Negotiating History . p. 2254
24 The affected United States companies allegedly determin ed the framework ofTRlPs with Japanese and
European commercial interests playing an import ant supporting role. See Ibid, at p.2254 .
25 In 1991 China was listed on the ' watch list' of Special 30 I. The USTR required , and China agreed to



















States suspended a privilege granted to India which allowed it to export certain
pharmaceuticals duty free to the U.S. This sanction cost India U.S$60 million in
export dollars 'f". For many Third World nations the decision to agree to TRIPs has
been a practical rather than an ideological choice.
1.2.2 1986-1994 - The TRIPs Negotiations
From the beginning, fundamental disagreements existed between the
developed and developing countries in the TRIPs negotiations.
T.P Stewart, A Negotiating History, p. 2269.
In 1985 during the Tokyo Round at the insistence of the United States the
International Anti- Counterfeiting Coalition was formed 27• The coalition studied the
counterfeiting problem and assisted the drafting of a proposed code on anti-
counterfeiting. No agreement was reached before the end of the Round28. The effort to
include counterfeiting in the GAIT work program was opposed greatly by the
developing countries . From their perspectives intellectual property is a public good
that should be used to promote economic development. 'Brazil and India argued that
GATT's jurisdiction was limited to tangible goods and therefore GAIT lacked legal
competence to address ari issue within the intellectual property area . They contended
that counterfeiting trademarked goods belonged to the exclusive jurisdiction of
26 E,Henderson. TRIPs and the Third World: The Example a/pharmaceutical patents in India, [1997],
19(11) E.I.P.R, p. 3.
27 The International Anti-counterfeiting coalition is an organization comprised of 100 multinational
corporations . It was created to lobby national governments to strengthen protection against counterfeit trade
marked goods. By the early 80's however its mandate was expanded to include strengthened protection for
all forms of intellectual property. .
28 The anti-counterfeitin g movement failed to draw broad support prior to the ministerial meeting of
1982 . During the preparatory work for the ministerial meeting, the U.S submitted a formal proposal
that articulated its position. Regarding counterfeit the United States submission ad vocated further



















WIPO,29 , This line of argument could not hold any ground after WIPO'S Director
General was specifically mandated to pat:.ticipate in the GATT intellectual property
negotiations,
In 1986 the WTO countries convened for their first session of the Uruguay Round.
Although some of the delegations continued to oppose GATT's involvement in
intellectual property, the GATT Council agreed to appoint an Expert group to
continue the work on the area. Opposition to intellectual property rights being
discussed within GATT gradually came to an end with one developing country after
another backing down on is protests. According to Doane.", once India backed down
on its very vocalised protests the industrialised countries knew that there would be an
agreement on intellectual property under GATT. Those countries that complied by
agreeing to have the negotiations in GATT were less willing to support those
countries that were opposed to it.
The United States managed to impose on the developing world its standard of
intellectual property rights. The main reason for this success lies in the fact that,
'faced with a choice between a multilateral system and isolation from the global
economy, most governments nowadays are predisposed ideologically to favour
multinational Agreements on important trade issues'?'. Moreover, several developing
countries were increasing the information-content of their exports and starting to
29 T.P Stewart, The GATT Uruguay round: A Negotiating History. p.2261
30 Michael L Doane, TRIPs an Intellectual Property Protection In An Age ofAdvancing Technology, 9, U.
J. Int'l L. & Po l 'y , p.465.
















compete with developed countries in certain high-tech fields .32 ' Inevitably some of
the more technologically-advanced Third World countries corporations will also wish
to protect their intellectual property at home and abroad, and consequently find the
availability of intellectual property rights protection increasingly desirable. ,33
Thus on September 2nd 1986 the ministers adopted an initial common declaration:
The Ministerial Declaration on The Uruguay Round, which outlined the course of
future negotiations on international trade. Under the Declaration the goal of TRIPs
negotiators was to formulate a multilateral agreement on minimum levels of
protection for intellectual property rights." The Ministers stated the negotiating
objectives for the TRIPs negotiating group. These were:
'In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international trade and
taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection to
intellectual property rights , and to ensure measures and procedure to enforce
intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate
trade the negotiations shall aim to clarify GAIT provisions and elaborate new
rules and disciplines. ,3 5
Through a series of detailed discussions and negotiations that spanned for 8 years the
negotiating parties toiled over the detail that was to be the TRIPs agreement. The
north-south divide was evident from a very early stage. 'In January 1988 many
32 These are main ly the MDC s the most important example being Hong Kong.
33 G, Dutffield . (fn 18) at p. 5
34 See Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, GAIT Doc. No. MIN.DEC (Sept. 20, 1986) .
35 Ibid p,445 .
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developed country governments reported to GAIT that their country company
operations were threatened not only by the well known practice of counterfeiting, but
also from problems more generally relating to inadequate intellectual property
protection. The developing countries expressed concern that they might be prevented
from securing access to modern technology through the over-protection of intellectual
property rights. ,36 After 8 years of discussion the TRIPs agreement was concluded
and signed by 125 governments on the 1st of January 1995.






























CHAPTER TWO THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
2.1 The problem of introducing greater intellectual property protection
in underdeveloped countries.
'Third world countries argue that TRIPs is inherently incompatible with the
interests of their technologically poor countries.'
Graham Dutfield, Can the TRIPs Agreement Protect Biological and cultural Diversity
pA .
Economic historians have concluded that there is a direct connection between the
granting of intellectual property and development. The less developed a country is the
less intellectual prope rty protection it will have or des ire. As it develops intellectual
property protection increases. Krichanski argues that ' the level of a countries
development alters the cost-benefit ratio of granting patents. As a country develops it
will pass through three stages, each of which presents a different cost - benefit picture
for the granting of patents. ,3 7
The first stage is that of a country at a very low level of economic development, A.
completely under-developed country has little technological capacity and
infrastructure, and will make few, if any, internationally 'patentable' inventions. Such
37S, Kirchanski. , Protection ojUnited States Patent Rights in Developing Countr ies: U.S Efforts to Enforce
Pharmaceutical Patents InThailand, . 16 Loy. L.A. Int'L & Comp LJ, 569. 1993 Loyola of Laos Angeles















a country would not benefit from a patent system because "as an under-developed
county it would not be limited by a shortage of inventions but by the ability to utilise
readily available technology. Whereas the economy of a developed country depends
on new inventions an underdeveloped country needs to expand its economy by
implementing new inventions which are already available in the public domain 'r".
The LDCs were at this stage before the TRIPs agreement.
As the country' economy develops, markets and the infra -structure necessary for
innovation will also develop, and the country will reach the second stage. 'The
country becomes capable of using more advanced technology and may become an
intellectual property piratev". Such a country is often rapidly developing and
increases its state of growth by intellectual property theft. The MDCs were well into
this stage before the TRIPs Agreement. As far as the pharmaceutical industry is
concerned, India was at this stage of development before 1994.
The third stage is reached when the country can create world -class inventions. At
that point it becomes profitable for the country to grant patent protection so as to
protect its own innovators. Profits from piracy of intellectual property are outweighed
by losses to the country its inventors caused by failure to protect their own inventions.
'Because intellectual property protection is on a quid pro quo basis, the country must
provide strong patent protection so that other advanced countries will reciprocate and
38 Ibid, p. 448
39E,Henderson. TRIPs and the Third World: The Example ofpharmaceutical pa tents in India, [1997] I9( 11)
























respect its patents. ,40. According to Krichanski, industrialised countries, including the
United States, reached this third stage over a century ago.
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The point here is that the developing countries are not ready in terms of development
for increased intellectual property protection." 'Attempts to force a country to adopt
an intellectual property scheme will be successful only if the country is sufficiently
developed to benefit form the scheme'Y, Through TRIPs the developing countries
have been denied the second stage. Somehow they hope to move on to the third stage
without going through the vital second stage of diffusing technologies that already
exist, a fit which the developed countries were, according to various economic
writers, unable to achieve. 'Many of the problems of international intellectual
property protection are caused by the failure of industrialised countries to recognise
the evolutionary nature of patent protection,43. It is the ignorance of this evolutionary
process that led to the TRIPs agreement being pushed forward by developed countries
with great determination. As indicated above developed countries introduced patent
protection in the pharmaceutical industry only 20-40 years ago. It is a shame that
developed countires which introduced patent protection for pharmaceutical products
and processes so recently, expect developing countires to introduce this protection
when they are hardly as developed as the developed countires were 20-40 years ago
The future for developing countries, which now have to apply intellectual property
protection, which they are not ready for, looks very bleak.
40 A. Damato, (fn 8) , at p.451
41 When it comes to the pharmaceutical industry a country has to be quite advanced before patent protection
can be beneficial. This is evidenced by the fact that industrialised countries introduced patent protection to
the pharmaceutical industry only 20 -40 yrs ago when infact most of them reached the third stage over a
century ago . See E.Henderson (fn II).
42 E. Henderson, TRiPs and the Third World: The Example ojpharmaceutical patents in India, [1997]
19(11) E.I.P.R, p. 18

























Before, during and after the negotiations for the TRIPs Agreement industrialised
countries pointed out that increased intellectual property protection would benefit
developing countries in many ways. The two most significant benefits cited were:
i)Technological transfer and the attendant investment; and
ii)Incentive for domestic innovation within domestic industries.
In contrast to this the developing countries argued that the TRIPs Agreement would
lead to insurmountable negative effects to their economies. One author went as far as'
to say that ' ultimately the only 'advantages' which developing countries can 15e
assured of, when they implement TRIPs, will be the avoidance of the economic and
trade sanctions which industrialised countries would be entitled to impose under the
terms of GATT were any other course to be adopted ,4 4 . In order to make an
assessment of the impact of increased intellectual property protection' enshrined in
TRIPs on the pharmaceutical products and industries in developing countries, a
detailed assessment of these claims is necessary.
2.2 Benefits: The argument in favour ofTRIPs as it impacts on
developing countries.
'There are substantial benefits for developing countries from protecting
intellectual property. The benefits are in form of investment and technology
flowing to the country, access by local firms to this technology and ultimately
economic growth '
44 Michelle,McGrath . The patent provisions in TRIPs: Protecting Reasonable Remuneration /or Services

























Manish.. Saurastri 'It's time for an effective patent regime in India' MIP 1996/97 vol
65 p. 34
Article 7 of the TRIPs Agreement proclaims that the objective of the Agreement is
' the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights' in' order to 'contribute
to the "promotion of technological innovation and the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technology'. Watal45
echoes this objective by stating that 'intellectual property protection helps countries
attract technology, diffuse it through the domestic economy and, ultimately develop
indigenous industries. Intellectual property protection achieves these effects by
providing the incentive for innovators to devote resources to research and
development'i'"
With reference to the pharmaceutical industry it has been claimed that developing
countries have a lot to gain for increasing patent protection. Before TRIPs most
developing countries that had any patent provisions excluded the pharmaceutical
industry from patent protection. In most cases process patents were allowed but not
product patents." One result of this is that patent applications for pharmaceutical
goods from both foreign and local scientists are rare in these countries . As such , one
disadvantage of having little or no protection for pharmaceutical goods is the fact that
the scientists have no incentive to research and develop new drugs as they are weary
45 J.Watal, (fn 17)
46 Ibid P 290.





































of not being rewarded adequately. ' Without patent protection, the incentive for
pharmaceutical firms to devote local resources to R&D is all but eliminated. , 48
The country, therefore, does not benefit from the advantages of having pharmaceutical
research and development (R&D) . The advantages of having R&D in the country are
varied and include the fact that; the country will receive technological transfer, new
industries will open up creating more employment, foreign investment will increase
and the overall economy of the country will pick up. The best way to attract R&D is
to have patent protection for both products and processes . R&D companies will feel
safe enough to open industries in a country with these rights. As indicated above the
R&D of a new pharmaceutical is very expensive. At the same time the reverse
engineering of these drugs and their production in bulk by pirates is extremely cheap .
Given this situation, the fact that the western-based pharmaceutical industry depends
on patents protection is no surprising factor. 'The pharmaceutical industry has been
identified as one of the few industries for which patents are actually important for
encouraging technological innovation and development. t'".
It has been claimed that 'Pharmaceutical R&D is conducted in those countries where
intellectual property is protected ' 50. Statistics taken in 1990 indicate that the regions
of ·the world where intellectual property protection was improving, received an
48 R. T. Rapp , R.P.Rozer Benefits and Costs ofIntellectual Property Protection in Developing
Countries, [1990] JWT 75, p. 97.
49 G.Dutfield,(fn 18) at p. 14
50 R T. Rapp , R. P. Rozer. Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries ,













increas ing share of R&D51. The statistics show an increase of 13.6% in Japan, which
implemented laws protecting pharmaceutical products in 1976. 'By contrast in Latin
America, where many countries have been reluctant to take steps to improve their
intellectual property protection the proportion of R&D spending by U.S firms has
decreased significantly from 8.4% of the total in 1977 to 2 per cent in 1987. ,52 In
addition, the introduction of a more protective patent system will encourage the
growth of indigenous inventions. This is because local scientists are encouraged to
R&D new drugs. This is evidenced by the example of Italy and China. In 1978, when
Italy introduced a strong patent system 'its turnover of indigenous pharmaceutical
production increased by 64% in six years, thus making Italy the fifth largest producer
of pharmaceuticals in the world. Even China, which adopted a patent system in 1993,
has seen a significant growth in the turnover of its indigenous pharmaceutical
. d ,53
In ustry
New uses for existing products are among the benefits of pharmaceutical research
obtained when firms are encouraged by patent protection and rewarded for their
innovative efforts. For example, the disease onchoecreciasis or river blindness, which
is transmitted through the bite of the blackfly, is a problem unique to the developing
world. 'River blindness afflicts 18 million people in Africa, Latin America and the
Middle East'54. The infected suffer a number of uncomfortable symptoms eventually
51R.T. Rapp , R. P. Rozer. Benefits and Costs ofIntellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries
p990] JWT 75, p. 89
2 Ibid, p. 88
S3 M. Saurastri 'It 's time for an effective pat ent regime in India' MIP 1996/97 vol 65 pg 34
S4R T. Rapp, R, P. Rozer. Benefit s and Costs ofIntellectual Property Protection in Developing Countr ies




















become completely blind. During the 1970s scientists at Merck'" developed Mectizan
(ivermetin) for the treatment of worm paras ites in livestock. Mectizan was fully
protected by patents in the countries it was sold . During this period, Merck scientists
also discovered that the drug worked on the same worms that cause river blindness.
Clinical trials were organised and by 1987, the safety and effectiveness of Mectizan
for river blindness were established.56 ' Without the exclusive right to the livestock use
of Mectizan, Merck would not have had the incentive and the resources to investigate
alternative uses of the product. ,57
In discriminating against the pharmaceutical industry, and not granting pateJ;1t
protection to its products, developing countries ignore the fact that patent protection
' induces research on the problems that are peculiar to their populationsf . Why would
researchers embark on the expensive mission of finding cures for these diseases if
they will not get any returns whatsoever from their output? Lack of patents protection
means that the drugs they have researched and developed with a considerable amount
of monetary investment will easily be copied by others and sold by them as if they
were part of the intellect and investment that produced the particular drug.
Not only does lack of patent protection discourage foreign scientists from embarking
in some life saving research, but local scientists are also discouraged. There is no
denying that most developing countries have a very well educated cluster of scientists
whose research and development capacities are being shelved daily due to lack of
55 Merck is a well known international pharmaceutical Company.
56 Merck announced a policy of providing the drug free of charge to all those who needed it.
57 R, T. Rapp, R, P. Rozer. Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing
Countries [1990] J.W.T 75, pp. 75 - 102
58 These diseases are diseases such as Chagas' disease in South America and sleeping sickness






























patent protection. In fact most of them immigrate to other countries where their work
will provide for them better incomes. It is not claimed here that lack of patent
protection is to blame for this massive immigration but it may certainly have
something to do with it . Under Article 27.10fthe TRIPs Agreement members cannot
discriminate between different fields of technology and thus developing countries will
have to grant both process and product patents to pharmaceutical products'". From the
evidence it seems that this will lead to R&D in the countries.
The governments of developing countries, having acknowledged that patents do give
incentive to invention and R&D, indicate that they would rather use other means of
encouraging R&D other than granting outright patents due to the costs associated with
patent systems.t'' These other arrangements include an award or prize system,
government conducted R&D or government supported R&D. 61 However it has been
argued that these alternatives do not adequately substitute for intellectual property
protection. In an award system, the first firm completing a specified project, which
subsequently becomes public property, receives a monetary prize. Determining the
award, however, is difficult. 'If it is announced in advance extensive knowledge of the
likely benefits of the underlying innovation most be known by the awarding party. If
the award is announced after the innovation, there is a tendency to exploit the fact that
the costs ofthe innovation are sunk and thus undervalue the innovation'Y
59 This is in accordance with WTO's Most Favoured Nation Clause. See Web Page
60 B.Sodipo, (fn 20).
6 1 J.Tirole . The theory ofIndustrial Organization . (Cambridge :MIT Press, 1984), p. 400
62 R .T. Rapp , R . P. Rozer. Benefit s and Costs ofIntellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries.


































With regard to the government actually performing R&D there is no better example
than the pharmaceutical industry in the United States. For the pharmaceutical industry
in the country, ' estimates of private spending for R&D equalled $7.3 billion for 1989,
whereas the estimated budget for pharmaceutical research by the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) in 1989 was $6.8 billion. ,63 However, even in the United States an
additional amount of R&D is required beyond what the government provides to create
products useful for particular diseases. Relying only on the government to provide
R&D activities will result in less innovation and lost opportunities." The problem in
developing countries is that the governments are already struggling with an already
over stretched budget with many of them having a high debt deficit. Governments of
developing countries, no matter how much they would like to, will probably have very
little or no money to devote to R&D. Finally , the government could negotiate
contracts with a firm or firms to complete a particular project. 'The advantage of this
method is that it limits the amount of duplication in R&D but the disadvantage lies in
the fact that in restricting competition, it reduces the incentive to innovate. , 65 Patent
protection therefore emerges as the best method ofencouraging local R&D.
One of the greatest fears of developing countries is that pharmaceutical prices will
increase due to increased patent protection. Rapp'" argues that developing countries
need not worry about increase in drug prices because this will most likely not happen.
He indicates that the most essential drugs are way past their patent age. The current
63 S.Patel. The Patent sys tem and the third world, [1974] 2 (9), World Development . p. 13
64 R.T ,Rapp, R.P , Rozer, (fn 48) pp 75-102
65 R, T. Rapp, R, P. Rozer. Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries
II990] JWT 75, p. 90.




























Essential Drugs List67 published by the World Health Organisation (WHO) contains
over 250 chemicals entries. Of the drugs on the list, over 90 percent are not protected
by patents. These drugs would be subject to competition from generic drugs produced
by companies in every part of the world. 'The only possible effect (on the price of
these essential drugs) that strengthening patent protection for new drugs could have is
to drive their prices down. Patent protection for new drugs fosters the creation of
substitute drugs. As the number of drugs that serve a similar purpose increases, the
c: • ducti I ' ,68pressure lor pnce re uction a so Increases.
In addition to this a patent grants exclusive rights for a limited amount of time for a
product or process narrowly defined by the claims of the patent. 'This narrowly
defined right to exclusivity must not be confused with monopoly power. Economists
define monopoly as a situation where one firm is the only supplier of a product or
service for which there are no close substitutes. In the pharmaceutical industry there
are dynamic competitive forces at work which serve to keep the prices of drugs
low ,69. Competition among pharmaceutical products for similar purposes is common.
For example, 'Inrton-A (schering-plogh) and Roferon (Roche) are interferon products
that compete with one another, although each drug has its own biomedical properties.
Tagament (cimetidine) and Zantac (ranitidine) compete in the anti-ulcer category.t"
The protection provided by intellectual property protection does not prevent other
products, for similar or almost similar functions from entering the market. 'This is
67 The essential drugs list published by the WHO contains those drugs selected as truly needed by the
majority of people . These are normally almost the same as the essential lists made by various countries.
68 R, T . Rapp , R, P. Rozer. Benefits and Costs ofIntellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries,
II990] JWT 75, p. 90.
9 Ibid, p .92





























clearly evident in the treatment of hypertension, where 19 new pharmaceutical
products or improvements of existing products entered the market between 1980 and
1990. ,71
Cornish72 supports Rapp by stating that 'a patent confers on the right holder the power
to restrict production and maintain prices so as to maximise profitability in the
absence of direct competition and in the case of a true break-through .73. Thus in the
presence of competition and unless the product is an important new discovery, the
patent holder will not be able to charge any price he pleases as market forces will
force him to maintain a reasonable price otherwise his product will not sell. Therefore
patents do not necessarily mean that prices will go up. The problem here is that
developing countries are in desperate need of break-through drugs for diseases such as
AIDS and cancer which have no substitutes and which are therefore extremely
expensive. A recent dispute in South Africa, which shall be discussed in chapter four,
arose out of measures taken by the South African Government to avail cheaper drugs
to its dying AIDS victims.
The other side of the coin presents us with arguments that suggest that the granting of
patents does not necessarily lead to investment, technological transfer, development
of the local industry or R&D . There are also strong suggestions that Rapp and those
who think like him are wrong about pharmaceutical prices not increasing in
developing countries due to the implementation of TRIPs.
71 Ibid . P 93
72 W.R.Cornish, (fn 9) pp 46-68


















2.3 Costs: The argument against TRIPs as it impacts on
developing countries
'Are LP laws to the general benefit of the public? Do they encourage creativity? Do
they create general wealth? Do they result in investment and technology transfer?
In the developing world the answer is probably ' no' . The prevailing perception is
that these laws merely protect ephemeral property rights if foreigners.'
L.T.C Harms Offering Cake for the south E.I.P.R 2000 , I0, p. 45I
Penrose74 indicates that ' foreigners seeking patents in less developed countries
normally do so primarily to enhance the monopoly position of their product in the
local market and thus the granting of patents does not assist in industrialisation nor
benefit local industry either through foreign investment, research or manufacture by
local businessmen. ' 75. Any investmentthat foreigners holding patents may put into the
country granting the patent will inevitably go out of the country and into the country
of the patentee as profits. ' When we talk about patents in developing countries we
really mean foreign patent holdings.t''. Developing countries do not have inventions
that they can paten t in industrialised countries and thus they cannot gain benefits that
rec iprocate those gained by foreigners holding patents in thei r countries.
74 E.Penrose, International Patenting and the Less Developed Countries, [1973] Sept E.C.S, pp.768-785.
75E.Penrose, Internat ional Patenting and the Less Developed Countries, [1973] Sept E.C.S, p.783.
76 C. Vaitsos, ' Patents revisited: Their junction in developing countries' Journal of Development Studies






















Vaitsos" sees in patents a 'defensive strategy' by foreign companies ' .. ..to preserve
markets that were once captured throu gh exports and are subsequently thre atened by
competitors within or without the coun try and/or by the import - substituting strategies
of the host countries . The evidence leaves open the possibility that, once the
investment decision is made, the existence of a patenting opt ion may serve to increase
the firm's chances for collecting monopoly rent on its activities. Put another way, the
prior existence of patent prote ction may reduce the country's bargaining scope
concerning the terms and conditions under which the investment can take place,78 In
this context patents far from providing a stimulus to fore ign investment, appear to be a
critical factor in blocking investments. 'Even recent studies in Australia and Canada
of the economics of patent protection have been unable to point to a decisive
economic justification for this form of intellectual property protection. Those reports
recommended the retention of the patent ~ystem largely because it already existed. :"
If this argument is true, it looks like the only thing TRIPs will do is to give
manufactures a 20 year monopoly .
A few LDCs had patent protection, even in the pharmaceutical industry, prior to
TRIPs . Examples are Kenya, Botswana and South Afr ica. However in these countries
there was little technological transfer due to the fact that the patents were not worked
in the countries. Company heads from indust rialised countries indicate that their
patents remained un-worked owing to the inadequate level of economic and
77 Ibid, P 449-531
78 P. Obrien, Developing Countr ies and the Patent System : An Economic Appraisal,[1974] 2(9) , p.33




















technological development of the patent-granting country.t" This means that the
patents were used exclusively to protect imports. Statistics show that 'At least 95 per
cent of patents in developing countries are never used in domestic production i.e.
there is no technological innovation and investment on the basis of these patents. It
could be that the remaining 5% are the most valuable. However, the costs associated
with the other 95% of patents in use thought the developing countries make it unlikely
that the patent-granting country receives any net benefits.'81 There is no reason why
this phenomenon will change after the implementation of TRIPs given the fact that
Article 27 of the Agreement comes close to encouraging the non- working of a patent
in the country granting the patent. This article indicates that there should be no
discrimination in granting of patents between import goods produced localll2 . The
TRIPs agreement may therefore lead to little technological transfer. This is a direct
contradiction of its main objective of technological transfer, as declared in Article 7.
It has also been claimed that even if no production takes place in the country granting
the patent, the fact of the grant may encourage inve~tment83. However according to
Obrien some statistics show a different story. 'Various summaries of questioners
enquiries indicate that patents have little influence on the investment decision' 84. It
has also been argued that un-worked patents provide a social benefit to developing
countries because the countries benefit through having information contained in the
80p, Obrien. (fu 78) at pp. 27-36
8\ Ibid p. 36
82 This is in accordance with Article 111 of GATT on National Treatment to all products whether
imported or domestic
83 See W.R Cornish, (fn 9)




















patent documents'f . As such industrialised countries claim that Article 7 is fulfilled in
developing countries simply by having the information in the documents. However
the true nature of inventions is often not identified in patent documents. Inventors
tend to cover up the true genius of the inventions in technical language. The TRIPs
Agreement requires disclosure in. the patent documents to a level that reasonably
skilled worker can understand . However, 'the knowledge disclosed may bear scant
resemblance to the skill levels in developing countries i.e. the patent information is
useless without the corresponding know-how 'J''. A library is of no use if one cannot
understand the language in the books. In addition to this, the technological know how
which may be found in the patent documents could be obtained very cheaply through
other channels. 'Since all foreign patents have previously been filed elsewhere,
subscription to such publications as the Gazette of the United States patent office
would suffice to keep up to date whilst avoiding the administration costs entailed in
. h .. h ,87repeating t e registration process at orne. .
One Canadian study shows no relationship necessarily between patents and
investment in R&D . 'The replies to a questionnaire prepared by the Canadian
Economic Council indicated that for 40 per cent of the companies concerned, the exits
of patent protecting was of little or no significance in deciding to embark upon
production in Canada; However 45 per cent replied that it was of 'fair significance' .88
Leser indicates that 'overall there is no direct statistical association between the
existence of patents and private R&D investment. Stronger patent laws are associated
85 W.R. Cornish, (fn 9) 56.
86 L.T.C ,Harms. Offering Cakefor the south , [2000] 10 E.l.P .R. p. 451.
87 P, Obrien. (fn 78) at p.33


















with more ' patent applications, but whether those inventions would be forthcoming
even in the absence of intellectual property protection is not known with certainty'I"
Thus on the issue of how far and to what extent patents provide an incentive for local
R&D, no clear and unambiguous answer can be given. Though several studies show a
. .
close relationship between patent and R&D and technology transfer several others fail
to reveal any. Penrose concludes that 'the presumption is strong that that the less-
developed countries gain little or nothing and may even lose from granting patents on
inventions developed published and primarily worked abroad. This presumption is
strong but not conclusive. The less-developed countries want to develop their own
industry. To this end, they need to absorb foreign technology from the industrialised
world .90, Dr Sodipo agrees with Penrose and points out that a problem with the
premise of technological transfer is that 'the evidence is equivocal, inconclusive or
not cannot be generalised from one country to others"
As indicated above Rapp argues that due to competition in the pharmaceutical
industry increased patented protection does not necessary lead to increased
pharmaceutical drug prices. However, the problem for developing countries lies in the
fact that the level of income is very low and unemployment levels astronomical. As
Dr Sodipo argues, despite competition in the pharmaceutical industry, western
pharmaceutical companies are not able to sell drugs at prices that are low enough for
89 Leser 1991:33,35-36. B, Dasgupta. Patent Lies and Latent Danger. http://www.epw.org.in/34-
1617/sa3.htm. p. 3
90 E. Penrose. International Patenting and the Less Developed Countries , [1973] Sept E.C.S, p.9
















the citizens of developing countries to afford them and yet high enough for the
companies to make a profit. Thus, notw ithstanding the fact that a drug has other
substitutes, the citizens of the developing countries will simpl y not be able to afford
the newer and better versions of the drugs despite the competition. If TRlPs was not
in place the generic producers of these substitutes would supply developing countries
with much cheaper and affordable drugs. For example Bayer 's Ciprob ay is an
antibiotic used to treat many infectious diseases. This antibiotic obv iously has many
substitutes. It is listed as an essential drug in South Africa as well as the Essential
Drugs Mod el List of the WHO . In South Africa ' the state tender price per 250mg
Ciprobay tablet (an anti-retroviral drug) , is R2.93 . The marked up retail price 250mg
Ciprobay in India is RO.65 i.e. 4.5 times cheaper.,92 Perhaps it is from these
considerations that most authors in the anti-TRlPs camp conclude that on the
implementation ofTRlPs, drug prices in developing countries will inevitably increase.
Subramanain'" investigated annual price welfare and profit effects consequent upon
the TRlPs Agreement for some developing countries. 'Welfare and price effects were
found to be negative although given the transitional per iod provided by the agreement
and the extensive time requ ired for the approval of a medicine, the effects would be
felt 20yrs hence. Annual welfare losses for India ranged between $162 and $1,261
million and annual profit transfer to foreign firms was estimated between $101 and
$839 million .'94 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development carried
92 Affidavit of Carmen Perez-Casas in The Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Asso ciati on of South A frica
and Others V The President ofthe Republi c of South A frica.
www.tac.org.za/drugcampaign/case/cn :4183/98 p. 5.
93 Subramanian A. ( 199 1) 'The international economics ofintellectual property right protection: a welfare
theoretic trade policy analysis' World Developm ent Vol 19 No 8. (August) pp. 945-956 .
















out an investigation in1996 into the possible effect on prices for pharmaceuticals in
developing countries on the implementation of TRIPs. ' Price effects were calculated
for four different scenarios, taking into account the initial competitive duopolistic
market structure and different price legalities and assertions with regard to the share
of patented drugs in the total market of each country. Price increases estimated for
patented drugs ranged from 5 per cent to 67 per cent. , 95.
What Rapp disregards is the fact that even if there are market forces at work in the
pharmaceutical market, the effect of these forces in bringing prices down can be very
strong in developed countries where the level of income is high but these forces will
be negligible in developing countries. The citizens of developing countries are very
poor as such they cannot afford drugs at prices , which are meant to recoup investment
in research and development no matter how many substitutes there may be. The WTO
has indicated that the solution to this price problem does not lie in doing away with
patents in the pharmaceutical industry but in differential pricing. Differential pricing
is when a drug is charged at different prices in different places according to the level
of income. The WTO came to this conclusion after a meeting that took place between
the 8th and 11th of April 2001 , in Hosbjor, Norway. The meeting was attended by
WTO and WHO representatives form both developing and developed countries . They
agreed that differential pricing was not contrary to the provisions in TRIPs and was
one way of ensuring that essential drugs could be afforded in developing countries.

























As indicated above; the greatest problem for developing countries is found where
there are no substitutes for an essential drug , meaning that there is no competition and
the prices are simply too high for them to be purchased in developing countries. There
are some pharmaceuticals which have no close substitutes . This is the case with
Retrovir (zidovudine), popularly known as AZT. AZT is used to treat patients with
AIDS. It is in the case of such rare drugs where the patent holder can charge
exorbitant prices which are unchecked by competition. Rapp suggests that 'any -anti
competitive effect should be balanced against the therapeutic gain that results when a
revolutionary new product appears'. The question here is how is this balance to occur
if the millions in developing countries who have AIDS cannot afford the drugs and
h . . h .. ?96t err t erapeutic gams.
In developing countries it is virtually impossible for AIDS patients to afford the anti-
retroviral drugs. 'It has been estimated that the most effective combination of
medicines to fight AIDS costs individuals in the United States $10,000 a year.
However the average income in South Africa is less than $1000 a year,97. Without
the TRIPs Agreement the South Africa government would be able to afford these
drugs at a much cheaper rate from Brazil. ' The South African trade price per 100mg
capsule of Glaxo SmithKline's Retrovir (Zidovudine) is R3.23 .. The Brazilian trade
price is R2 .91 (1,46 times cheaper) .' 98 However, under article 31 of the TRIPs
agreement compulsory licensing of intellectual property rights m certain
circumstances is possible. Compulsory licensing is when a government allows
96 Harms equates Rapp 's suggestion to that of Queen Marie Antoinette of France who asked her people
to eat cake as they could not afford bread. See L.T.C Harms (fn 83)
97 F. Wooldbridge, Analysis: Affordable Medicines-TRIPs and United States Policies,[2000j I, LP.Q , as
Obtained from westlaw , p.l




























someone else to produce the patented product or process without the consent of the
patent owner. South Africa is making preparations to implement the Medicines and
Related Substances Control Amendment Act 1997. Article 10 of this Act allows for
compulsory licensing of drugs in certain circumstances for the benefit of the public
health. The details of this legislation and the dispute surrounding it shall be discussed
in chapter four.
In the past the research that has produced the cure to killer diseases such as polio and
malaria was done merely as a response to an urgent need of the human race. Scientists
are currently searching for other compounds to alleviate the symptoms of AIDS.
Although it has been claimed that 'substantial amounts of research for new produces
that represent improved forms of therapy for AIDS would not be conducted without
the incentive provided by the intellectual property protection system.i'", it is not far
fetched to say that this research would be taking place, albeit on a smaller scale, to
alleviate the human suffering and death caused by AIDS. Patents are not the only
incentive that scientist have to create new drugs.
Thus will greater patent protection mean pharmaceutical product prices will increase
in developing countries.? Most likely yes. Do patents granted on foreign inventions to
foreign patentees facilitate the transfer of technology, foreign skills and foreign
capital? This is a simple question, but it has no conclusive answer. 'Most of the
evidence indicates that patents are of little importance, but it is possible that in some



















industries and in some circumstances foreign patenting will promote technological
transfer and its implantation in the local economy.' 100 Therefore the often quoted
rationale for the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement that it would encourage
technological transfer is only but a presumption with most evidence showing that it is
not true. However as Penrose indicates some industries may just need patent
protection in order to develop. As patents are very important in the pharmaceutical
industry, the provision of stronger pharmaceutical protection in developing countries
through TRIPs may indeed be a means of the development of this industry, the
transfer of technology and its attendant investments. Whether or not this speculation is
true will only be evident some years after 2005 when TRIPs becomes fully operation
in developing countries. A closer look at the impact of TRIPs on the pharmaceutical
industries of India and South Africa may provide us with a clue.
\00 E,Penrose. International Patenting and the Less Developed Countries. [1973] Sept E.C.S, p.9
45
Brian Tempest, president of Ranbaxy Laboratories ,India' s largest drug maker.
staff, low wages rates and a potentially sizeable local market '
The availability and price of pharmaceutical products is of particular importance in
manufacturing costs are two-thirds of rich-country levels. It has good research
TRIPs and INDIACHAPTER THREE
3.1 India 's patent law before TRIPs












India. Sickness and disease are widespread and there is a great deal of poverty and
unemployment. While it was a British colony India had a strong patent law, which
was mainly put, in place to benefit the interests of British patent holders. As such
' Indian drug prices were among the highest in the world , partly due to the fact that
90% of the pharmaceutical market was controlled by foreign owned companies and
India was completely dependant on Imports ' I'"
J After independence in 1945 India conducted two reviews of its patent system through
J
two committees; the Tek Chand Committee and The Ayyangar Cornm ittee' Y'. The
Tek Chand Committee made several unsuccessful attempts to enact a Patents Act. The
J issues that dominated the debates were whether patents should be available for food,
J
med icine and chemicals and if so whether product and process patents should be
available. What was most evident in the parliamentary debates was the long-standing
J 101 E,Henderson. TRIPs and the Third World: The Example ofpharmaceutical pa tents in India, [1997],I9(II )E.I.P.R,p. I5



















opposition of India to patents in the pharmaceutical industry. These issues also
centred upon the work of the Ayyangar Committee. Its efforts were successful and it's
work was rewarded by the passing of the Patents Act 1970.
The Indian Government was aware of the importance of having patent protection
generally but also wanted to ensure that drugs were affordable. This act reflects the
compromise that the government was prepared to reach. 'The government did not
choose to discard patent protection but did choose to severely limit the availability of
patent protection, particularly for inventions relating to food, medicine and
chemicals.' 103 As shall be discussed below, the overall effect of the Patents Act 1970
was to allow almost no patent protection in the pharmaceutical industry . The same
effect applied to the chemical and food industries . Due to very weak patent protection
for pharmaceutical products , a very lucrative generic drug industry came up in India .
Generic drugs are drugs which are about to reach the end of their patent life and
which are manufactured by other companies without the specify permission or license
from the patent holder. The provisions, which facilitated the growth of this industry,
are relatively easy to pick out from the Act.
One of the most important provisions in the Act was sec 48(2). This Section made a
distinction between .
process patents--a patent for a method or process of manufacturing an article or
substance whereby the patentee gains the "exclusive right ... to use or exercise the
103E,Henderson. TRIPs and the Third World: The Example a/pharmaceutical patents in India, [1997],





















method or process in India" and
product patents-a patent for an article or substance whereby the patentee gains the
"exclusive right ... to make, use, exercise, sell or distribute such articles or substance
in India".
Article 5 of the 1970 Act allowed for process patents but not for product patents for
food, medicine and agro-chemicals.
Thus a person could gain a patent for pharmaceutical process but not for a
pharmaceutical product. The ' process patent' for a particular medicine would be the
actual physical process of making it and the combination of all the ingredients that the
medicine is comprised of in specific propositions. These include for example
medicinal plants, herbs, chemicals and other biological products as well as the
technique of combining them in order to come up with the desired medicine. 'It was
therefore, possible for an India pharmaceutical company to buy a 'process' of making
a particular medicine by using cheap, local material. This way life saving drugs could
be sold in India at a price that is one - twentieth of the price in the developed
countries,104
The patent term for most inventions under the Act is fourteen years , which contrasts
with the twenty-year term found in most western country jurisdictions. To make
matters better for the India pharmaceutical industry, the patent term for
pharmaceutical process is only seven years from the date of application or five years
























from the date of sealing whichever is shorter. This is again much shorter than what
the laws of most industrialised countries permit. In practical terms this seven or five
year protection period for process patents amounted to no protection at all. This is
because, 'on average pharmaceutical drug manufacturing processes take eight years to
come into the market by which time , the patent protection in India would have
expired,105 . As such in some cases the India pharmaceutical companies did not even
get a licence for the process from a foreign company as they could lawfully obtain it
from any source once it was available in the market without permission from the right
holder. This, comb ined with a notoriously slow court system means that, 'in effect
almost no patent protection is available for pharmaceuticals in India <1 06.
In addition to this sections 84-90 the Patent Act 1970 had very wide provisions on
compulsory licensing.. Any person could apply for a compulsory licence where:
'the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patent invention
have not been satisfied or where the patented invention is not available to the
pub lic at a reasonable price ' 107.
India attempted to gain benefits from having patent protection by making it
conditional on local working of the patent. If the patent holder did not comply with
this requirement he would be required to licence the patent rights to local industries in
return for compensation failure to which the government would grant the license.
This licensing was an important measure that further weakened patent laws in India
105 E,Henderson. TRIPs and the Third World: The Example ofpharmaceutical patents in India, [1997],
19(11) E.I.P.R, p. 1I. .
106 Ibid, p. II





















'the Government took an interventionist approach in terms and conditions of the
licensing Agreement and controlled royalty payments. ' 108
The overall result of the Act was a ' rapid decline in new applications from non-
nationals and an even greater decline in domestic and foreign pharmaceutical patents
applications The lack of patents protection, combined both high tariffs on bulk drugs
and intermediates, were additional benefits for domestic drug companies. These
measures resulted in foreign companies losing interest in India such that the India
industry came to dominate the local market.' 109. Thus the pharmaceutical industry in
India flourished considerably depending solely on the weak patent rights for
pharmaceutical goods and producing generic drugs for home use and export.. In 1997
it was concluded that India had 'the largest number of operating unites in the
world.' 110 Further it was considered to be the world's fourth largest industry Ill . Its
total value was estimated as $2000 million and was made up of both inland and
foreign companies.. Chiefly the companies relied on the generic drug market and
were very competitive in this market at an international level. The India drug industry
had an international reputation as a reliable manufacturer of bulk drugs. . The most
important result of the 1970 Act was that the cost of drugs in India were among the
lowest in the world. Because these .drugs were produced in India at a fraction of the
cost of production in the developed countries, India became the source of cheap drugs
for the developing world.
\08 E,Henderson. TRIPs and the Third World: The Example a/pharmaceutical patents in India. [1997],
I9(I I) E.I.P.R, p. Obtained form WestIaw p. 13.
109 Ibid, p. IS.
110 Ibid, p. 18.






















3.2 The negative effects ofTRIPs on India.
The Indian pharmaceutical industry became profitable in the latter half of this
century largely because of government controls, price ceilings, tariffs and lack of
product patent protection as well as favourable treatment for India companies.
The provisions of TRIPs and the measures brought about by GATT will see an
end to most of these features.
E,Henderson. TRIPs and the Third World: The Example ofpharmaceutical patents in
India
Before and during the Uruguay Round, the Indian population and the Indian
pharmaceutical industry had different fears . The population, made up of a majority of
very poor people, feared that the implementation of TRIPs would make drug's in India
very expensive. The pharmaceutical industry feared that it would be displaced by
multinational corporations which would gain a monopoly in India due to having a
bulk, if not all, ofthe share of patented drug manufacturing .
Prior to TRIPs the industria lised countries were very unhappy with the patent law in
India . The United States ' pharmaceutical companies made great losses due to the
cheap drugs sold worldwide by the India companies which they could not compete
with. A report cited by the president of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Associat ion, Gerald J. Mossin ghoff claimed that in ' India alone, United States
companies had lost two million dollars to the pirating of patents between 1980 and
51
1994?112 The multinational companies whose drugs were being copied and
manufactured in India claimed that the reverse engineering and bulk production of
their products amounted to theft. I 13 The United States was determined to stop this
theft in India.
The monopoly granted by western nations had enabled western pharmaceutical
companies to make high profits. However the western market was increasingly
becoming saturated. Developing countries such as India became potentially ideal
markets for pharmaceutical products . A high rate of sickness combined with huge
population, which were and are still rapidly increasing, resulted in high demand. In
India 'the growth of population per year at present surpasses the entire population of a
whole nation when countries in Europe or Africa are being considered. Just 10% of
such a population represents a large market for goods and processes protected by
patents even if the disparity of income remains great.' 114 However the lack of patent
protection in India and indeed in many developing countries, meant that the
pharmaceutical industries of the developed world lost out to the cheaper generic
copies . It is hardly surprising; therefore that the Indian companies claim that one of
the aims of the advocators of TRIPs was to make sure that the multinational
pharmaceutical companies of developed countries had a significant if not total share
in the markets of developing countries 1I5. However those who pushed forward the
TRIPs Agreement simply point out that they were forced to do so in order to protect
112 E,Henderson. TRIPs and the Third World: The Example ofpharmaceutical patents in India, [1997],
19(11) E.I.P .R, Obtained form Westlaw p. 15.
113 Ibid, pp 1-22.
114 M. Saurastri 'It 's time for an effective patent regime in India ' MIP 1996/97 vol 65 pg 34


















their suffering industries'I". Whatever the truth is, TRIPs contains provisions which
. may harm India considerably.
The lack of product patents for foods, medicines and agro-chemicals in Indian Law
caused the most controversy in the international community. Under Art icle 27 of the
TRIPs Agreement the distinction between 'process' and 'product' patents has been
abolished. It is the product that is patented. The process is also implicitly patented at
the same time. After 2005, if India decides to avoid trade sanctions by amending the
1970 Patens Act to comply with the provisions of TRIPs, pharmaceutical products
will be protected by patents 117. Thus before a twenty year period is over for each new
pharmaceutical product, the products will have to be purchased from foreign
companies. This situation has two possible consequences. Firstly drug prices will
increase considerably and the local generic industry will go out of business, as it will
be illegal to reverse engineer and produce patented pharmaceutical products. It is
because of the possibility of these two serious consequences that India was up in arms
against the TRIPs Agreement.
Under the 1970 Patent Act the average citizens in India could afford most drugs and
Indian drugs were said to be five to thirty percent lower in price than they were in
countries that allow product patent for pharmaceuticals. I 18 From an analysis of
detailed market data on patentable drugs in the pre-product stage in India, it is clear
116 The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History.
117 India has not as yet amended this law and is most reluctant to do so.
118 For more on specific prices of pharmaceutical products in India after the TRIPs Agreement see. Mesevage
(1991) , The carrot and the stick '- protecting U.S intellectual property in developing countries ' 17 (2)



















that 'a move to monopoly position, through TRIPs would entail welfare losses in the
order of$33 million and an average increase in price in drugs of about 52 per cent'!".
Under Section 84 of the Patents Act 1970 the India Government could grant
compulsory licences if a drug was too dear for the average citizens to afford it.
Compulsory licensing normally happens if a government deems an essential drug too
costly or too short in supply. The government licenses local generic manufacturers to
make it more cheaply. Section 84 states that if a ' patented invention is not available to
the public at a reasonable price' anyone can apply for a compulsory licence. This will
not be possible under the TRIPs Agreement. The Agreement does not provide for
compulsory licences where products are expensive. It is inevitable that the TRIPs
Agreement will result in a sharp increase in drug prices. This will impact heavily on
India. As indicated in Chapter one, competition within the pharmaceutical industry
may not serve to reduce prices in India.
Besides not providing for compulsory licensing where drugs are expensive, Article 31
of TRIPs lists a series of detailed provisions, which must be respected in regulating
any use of the patent without the patent owner's authorisation. These provisions will
severely limit the power of the Indian Government, to grant compulsory licenses.
Among a host of other conditions, the patent not meeting ' the reasonable requirements
of the public,120 will not be enough to merit the granting of compulsory licences.
Compulsory licences will only be granted if the person seeking the license has
attempted to obtain a licence from the patentee unless it is in the case of national
119 1.Watal , (fn 17), pg 300.


















emergency, extreme urgency or for public non-commercial use.l2l In other words the
government is entitled to grant automatic compulsory licences only under these three
circumstances. In addition , the licence can only be of a limited duration and scope.
According to the 1970 Act, the patent did not meet the 'reasonable requirements of
the public ' if it was not worked in the country. Therefore the Indian Government
granted compulsory licences where a patent was not worked in India. This is no
longer possible under the TRIPs agreement. Nowhere in the TRIPs Agreement is non-
working of a patent in the country granting the patent a reason for granting
compulsory licenses. In addition to this, as indicated in chapter two, a close reading of
Article 27 shows an implication that local working of a patent is not necessary. Article
27 indicates that there should be no discrimination in granting of patents between
import goods produced locally. 'The combined effect of Articles 27 and 31 is that
local working of the patent by the owner is not required so long as importation of
patented products ' is sufficient to meet local needs ' 122 is provided. The Indian
Government will have very little room to deal with un-worked patents in its territory.
TRIPs will take away from India the advantages of having patents worked locally.
These include employment and a certain level of profit brought about due to local
production. Most importantly, Article 27 does not seem to lend much support to
Article 7 which indicates that the main objective of TRIPs is technological transfer.
This is a serious and most unfortunate contradiction. Technological transfer is not
likely to take place if patents are not worked in the developing countries.
121 TRIPs Article 31 (b).
122 M, McGrath. The patent provisions in TRIPs: Protecting Reasonable Remuneration/or Services






















The Indian generic industry strongly relied on lack of patent protection while the
western pharmaceutical industry strongly relies on patent protection. 'As a result of
TRIPs the Indian industry will be required to compete on western industry terms and
in legal environment to which it is a newcomer. ' 123 An Indian committee working on
patents laws estimates that most of the 10,000 local manufactures which now produce
70% of the county's drugs, would eventually go out of business once TRIPs is
implemented. 'Local firms would be in danger of going out of business as better
medicines monopolised by their inventors replace the drugs prescribed today .,124
Their very existence and ability to make profits depends on weak patent laws. Once
these are replaced by the provisions in TRIPs, a high percentage of the generic
industry shall certainly be wiped out of the picture.
At present the generic pharmaceutical industry in India is run by foreigners .The
presence of these foreign pharmaceutical companies run by foreigners promotes the
transfer of technology and information to the scientific communities in India. This
technology and information benefits the local companies greatly. However the
implementation of the TRIPs Agreement will remove all these benefits. 'When TRIPs
comes into force in India, it has been predicated that the local producers of products
which can be patented will gradually find themselves cornered out of the market, and
any hopes of fostering indigenous R&D will be smothered' 125. In other words TRIPs
will achieve the exact opposite of what it promised. Technological transfer will be
123 E.Henderson,. TRiPs and the Third World: The Example ofpharmaceutical patents in India, [1997],
19(11) E.I.P.R , p. 16
IUT he Economist, 'intellectual property. is theft ' 22
nd January 1994 p. 63
125 M, McGrath . The patent provisions in TRiPs: Protecting Reasonable Remuneration for Services


















reduced if not completely done away with. In fact, 'TRIPs will be the vehicle for
frustrating development efforts in India and probably increasing the country's
dependence on and indebtness to the industrialised countries. ,126
Another controversial provision of TRIPs, as far as India is concerned, is Article 34.
The Article reverses the burden of proof in patent cases: it is for the defendant to
prove that an identical pharmaceutical product has been produced by a process other
that the patented one. The defendant is presumed guilty until ·he proves himself
innocent. Article 29 of TRIPs indicates that the appropriate description must disclose
the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a
person skilled in the relevant art. However as indicated above, a person skilled in the
relevant art in an industrialised country may be much more skilled than 'a skilled
person' in a country still developing its industrial base. For this reason section 10(4)
of India's 1970 Act indicates that the description, in the patent documents must be
sufficient to enable a person in India 'possessing average skill in, and average •
knowledge of, the art to which the invention relates to work the invention'. This
provision will obviously have to disappear in compliance with Article 29 ofTRIPs by
the year 2005 meaning that India will have a great deal of information from patented
medicines which she has no skill to work. It is important to remember here that most
Indian scientists in India who may be 'skilled in the art' are working in foreign
countries127.
126 ibid p. 400.
127 Prof Sachs indicates that many of the scientific and technological breakthroughs are made by poor-
country scientists working in rich-country laboratories. Indians accounts for a great number of these
scientists. See J.Sachs, Helping the World's Poorest, The Economist August 14'h 1999 pp 15-20
.57
Reverse engineering has effectively been denied to the pharmaceutical industry in
India TRIPs . 'In the case of Japan and other east Asian countries 'reverse
engineering' was nearly always the first step towards technological self-sufficiency, a
path that India can no longer take.' 128 As indicated in chapter one every developed
country has gone through a three stage development process with the second stage
being the stage where the economic development of the country is fuelled by the
pirating of intellectual property. Some established companies such as Microsoft even
went through this important second stage . It is common knowledge !hat the first
windows program was designed after some information had been 'stolen' from
another company called Apple . Prior to TRIPS India had not yet reached the third
stage where patent protection is important to its development as it could not yet
produce its own world class .inventions. 'If the country has not reached this point, the
cost of intellectual property protection will outweigh its benefit and the protection
scheme, if adopted, will be enforced only sporadically' 129. India, like many
developing countries, has been denied an important stage of development and only
time will tell if it will be able to develop without going through this important stage .
In India a patent was protected as long as they were worked in the country for a
considerable period. If it was not worked then the compulsory licensing measures
would be taken and the right holder would be compensated. 'Before TRIPs, Indian
128 B,Dasgupta. Patent Lies and Latent Danger. http://www.epw.org.in/34-1617/sa3 .htm. p. 7
129 Kirchanski: Protection ofUnited States Patent Rights in Developing Countries ; United States
Efforts to Enforce Pharmaceutical Patents in Thailand. [1994] 16 Loyola LA International and Comparative




















law on intellectual property strikes one as having already found a reasonable balance
between fair remuneration and promoting the national interest in development. The
1970 Act focused on the public interest rather than on the protection of private
property interests ' 130. Its underlying philosophy is expressed in section 83, which
states:
, ... patents are granted to encourage inventions and to ensure that the inventions are
worked in India on a commercial scale and to the fullest extent that is reasonably
practicable without undue delay
... they are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for the
importation of the patented article. '
'The rationale underpinning Indian patent law is that the government grants exclusive '
rights to exploit an invention on a quid pro quo basis. In return for exclusive rights the
patent owner works the invention in India leading to the establishment of a new
industry, increased employment and capital. Patent law centers around this bargain--
exclusive rights in exchange for knowledge and input into the local economy. ,131 This
bargain has now been replaced by an Agreement, which on the face of it seems to be
leaning very much on the side of the industrialized countries and which may have
adverse negative effects on India.
Article 65 sets down transition periods for the implementation of substantive changes
to domestic law, which are required by TRIPs. India had ten years to implement the
substantive TRIPs provisions into domestic law. This means that it will be able to
130 M. McGrath, (fn 122), 402
131 Elizabeth,Henderson. TRIPs and the Third World: The Example a/pharmaceutical patents in India,






















prohibit pharmaceutical product patents until January 2005. 'However India had to
comply with some minor TRIPs provisions before then, including the requirement that
it had to accept patent applications by January 1 1995,132. This is yet another
disadvantage to India as it has to suddenly apply intellectual property law, which it is
not economically, socially or intellectually ready for.
3.3 The positive impacts of TRIPs on India.
India should realise the great potential it has. The country posses the third
largest number of scientific personnel in the world and could become a strong
force in the world market for drugs and medicines. But the present inhibitions
and shortcomings in the Patents Act 1970 only help in making Bonsois, i.e.
rather decorative white elephants, of its vast scientific community
Manish Saurastri 'It 's time for an effective patent regime in India' MIP 1996/97 vol
65 pg 34
Just as there are bound to be disagreements between Third World countries over the
appropriate stance that should be taken in trade negotiations, countries may be divided
internally as well. Although farmers in India are usually assumed to be vehemently
opposed to TRIPs, Bhat 133 reports that one farmers' group in that country supported
TRIPs in hope of better trade prices for certain commodities whose prices were kept
low by government interventions such as monopoly purchase programmes and import
substitution'P" Despite all the negative effects of the TRIPs Agreement to the generic
132 ibid p. 4
133 Bhat, 1996 as cited in G. Dutfield, (fn 18), p. 4

















industry and community at large, within India there is some support for the TRIPs
Agreement.
Surprisingly this support is coming from the pharmaceutical industry itself. Many
local pharmaceutical firms 'support extending process patents protection from the
current seven years to twenty years as the TRIPs Agreement stipulates, since their
own processes are being stolen by other local firms ,135. There are firms i~ India
which need protection for their own inventions. The 1970 Act caused a decline in both
local and foreign pharmaceutical companies seeking patents in India. The guarantee
of protection of rights in TRIPs may encourage India scientists to invent new drugs.
'India has a highly educated labour force . Our R&D and technological capabilities in
select fields are not inconsiderable and the scientific and technical manpower in India
is the third largest in the world. The talents and creativity of the components of this
manpower cannot bloom in an intellectual wasteland devoid of incentives and
protection ... .It is for this reason above all other that we need a strong sand effective
patent regime, free from the obstacles that dog it at present' !36
One of the possible things that may happen in the Indian pharmaceutical industry is
that the India pharmaceutical industry may develop from a generic production
industry to a research and manufacturing industry. As Abuja! 37 claims 'once the
various controls on the drug industry are removed and the Patent Law amended, the
big Indian drug companies expect to grow tenfold in the coming decade. All the top
135 The Economist, Brand X is Better , (1 July 1989), p. 58
136 M. Saurastri 'It's lime for an effective patent regim e in India ' M.I.P [1996/97] 65, p. 33
















50 Indian drug companies have plans to upgrade their R&D facilities to accommodate
new products and process. Most Indian companies are actively seeking joint ventures
with British, Israeli, South African and American companies to manufacture and
k II . d · 138mar et new as we as genenc pro ucts .
In any case one of the arguments that the Unites States had, at the advent of TRIPs,
was that India could support a number of large research based pharmaceutical
companies. It has the expertise and the infrastructure to do that. The same plants
where bulk generic goods were produced can be used to produce drugs researched by
the many India scientists who work abroad and at home. Creation of such companies
will create jobs to the many unemployed people in India and develop a profitable
export market. 'It may also lead to increased research and development in India. If
patent protection were to foster a strong research based industry then this would be of
considerable benefit to local skilled workers. Stronger protection may give incentive
to local scientists to invent rather than copy. Manish points out that 'a nation is not
healthy if its creativity was not fully taken care. The 1970 Act inhibits, a good many
number of worthy inventions from seeing the light of day,139. From the evidence it
seems that ' the day' for these inventions has now arrived with the introduction of
TRIPs.
138 Ibid p. 32



















This challenge of transforming Indian drug firms from copycats to innovators is
already being carried out by a number of India drug companies. From a recent article
in the economist'I" it is reported that one Dr Anji Reddy's Hyderid based company
has already come up with inventions of its own ' It has licensed two diabetics drugs to
a Danish firm, which is testing them on human subjects 014 1. Another firm called
Ranbaxy has turned from stra ight copying to finding other ways of delivering
generics . Ranbaxy is 'targeting difficult-to-make products; and it is innovating,
specialising in new ways to control the release of a drug into a patient's system and
thus reduce the number of times he must take it.,142 This evidence seems to verify the
claim that ' protecting intellectual property provides the incentive to search for new,
improved products or new uses for old products.' 143 If other companies follow the
footsteps of these two pioneers then India will benefit as a whole. The other group of
people who will benefit are the research scientists who will now be much needed at
home and thus will not have to immigrate to work in the cutting edge pharmaceutical
industry. ' Once India develops a viable and competitive world class pharmaceutical
industry, then there will be more winners that losers 0144.
Indian scientists have argued that the Indian Government should subsidise any losers
as 'this would be a small cost in comparison with the benefits which will result from




143 R. T. Rapp , Richard P. Rozer. Benefits and Costs ofIntellectual Property Protection in Developing
Countries , [1990] JWT 75, p. 95.
144 E, Henderson. TRIPs and the Third World: The Example ofpharmaceutical pat ents in India, [1997],

















TRIPs' 145. If the Indian government can afford to do this then this would indeed be
an amicable solution. However the chances are slim given that India is a developing
country. There is no doubt that the government would rather spend its limited
resources on other ventures rather than on subsidizing manufactures of generic drugs
whose companies are suffering due to the introduction ofthe TRIPs agreement.
There is even a flicker of hope as far as drug prices are concerned. Taking into
account the transactional period of the TRIPs agreement there will be absolutely no
impact on the price of new patented drugs on the India market until 2005 'not more
that 15 percent by value of the India market will be covered by the new patents
sometime after 2005 and the remaining 85 per cent of the market will continue to be
exposed to the full impact of generic competition' 146 Most of the essential drugs made
by India companies at low prices will have been in the world for well over 40 years.
These range from essential and well-known drugs like panadol , anadin, cough syrups
to life saving drugs such as malaria tablets. Thus India drugs companies will still be in
business if they choose to continue producing these drugs. Drugs are not 'non-
perishable' goods which need to be changed every 7 years or so. The cheap prices of
. the drugs produced in India will be no match for the expensive prices in industrialised
countries and as such will still be an important export for India to other developing
countries.
145 Elizabeth,Henderson. TRIPs and the Third World: The Example a/pharmaceutical patents in India,
[1997] , 19(11) E.I.P .R, p. 18








Despite a number of Bills being put before parliament since 1994 to amend the
Patents Act 1970 no amendments have yet been passed. The Indian government has
stated, however that when passed, the amendments will take effect retroactively from
January 1995147. Despite the fact that India is a signatory to TRIPs , there has been
widespread political resistance in India to any attempts to implement TRIPs in
domestic law. In August 1996 The Hindu reported that the government was to take a
' go slow ' approach. 'In the meantime the United States has been placing considerable
pressure on India to comply with its obligations' 148. The United States has brought a
complaint against India before the WTO for failing to amend its patent laws and in
1996 it placed India on a priority watch list under special 301. India has until 2005 to
implement the agreement or face serious trade sanctions. India will eventually have to
implement TRIPs . This implementation will have both positive and negative effects in
India. It remains to be seen which of the two will be the overall effect.
147 The Hindu January 1995 as cited in E. Henderson, (fn 11) p.8




'Protecting human life must take precedence over protecting intellectual
4.1 Too much protection - drugs too expensive
Carmen Perez-Casas, Coordinator for access to Patented Medicines in the
organisation Doctors without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontieres-International) .







AIDS was discovered twenty-one years ago and has now become the world's greatest
J
pandemic. An estimated 36 million people are infected with HIV and another 22
million have died form AIDS so far. An estimated 16,000 new infections occur
everyday worldwide. Based on current trends AIDS death will exceed those
J
associated with the Black Plague of the 14th century by the year 2004 149. When AIDS
was first discovered there was no treatment for it. Through a lot of tireless research
J
J
scientists made a great breakthrough in the mid 1990s when they developed a highly
active anti-retroviral therapy (HAART), a treatment cocktail of anti-retroviral drugs.
'Since the advent of HAART the disease has been transformed into a treatable and





Since HAART was such a new and extremely important discovery it was patented
immediately and is sold at exorbitant prices with no chance of the prices going down






























in the short run as it has no competing drug. Those who can afford it are mainly found
in wealthy countries which have governments whose budgets are able to subsidize
prices for those there , who cannot afford them .As such in wealthy countries, there has
been dramatic success in the fight against HIVIAIDS largely through the use of
antiretroviral therapy. Those with access to this therapy have a better qual ity of life
and a longer survival span. Yet despite this success , anti-retroviral therapy remains
largely inaccessible to the 95 percent of those suffering form AIDS who live in low-
income countries. In the poorer countries of sub-Saharan Africa and other affected
parts of the world, HAART remains almost completely unavailable. It is estimated
that only around 10,000 of Africa's 25 million HIV-positive can afford HAART. 151
There are soaring death rates from HIVIAIDS in these countries. South Africa is no
exception.
It is estimated that 4m citizens of in South Africa are infected with AIDS (out of a
population of 43million). It is true to say that the higher the percentage of people with
AIDS the higher the percentage of uninfected people who may get infected in the
future. In South Africa the number of HIV infected people who die every year has
been estimated to be 400,000 152. If these focuses are correct the disease will send
4million South Africans to an early grave in the next ten years. 'If the pessimists are
right, it will have killed as many as 6million by 2010 when the epidemic is expected
to reach its peak. That would mean that AIDS would have claimed as many as Hitler's
Holocaust, in South Africa alone ,153. This high death rate has been attributed to the
151 UNAID as citied in Harvard article (fn 149) p.2
152 Ibid, p. 2























fact that most of these people cannot afford the expensive medicines that are available
which could be able save their lives or give them a longer and better quality of life.
South Africa being a member of the WTO is a signatory of the TRIPs Agreement. As
such , South Africa has to protect the patents found in the HAART therapy. It has been
pointed out that ' if the patents owned by American and other multinational
pharmaceutical companies are strictly enforced, AIDS patients in South Africa will
not receive treatment and will continue to die. Without such patent protection the
relevant drugs could be profitably produced in South Africa at a cost of $200 per
patient per year,154. It currently costs $10,000. This is an outrageous price given th~t
the average income in South Africa is less than $1000 per year 155• Patients are dying
miserable deaths when anti-retroviral drugs are available in chemists and hospitals
across the country. The only way patients can get drugs is if they participate in drug
trials. At presentations to the South African Parliamentary Comm ittee on Health on
the is" of May 2001, one HIV patient woman, Fagmida Miller, explained that she
was on clinical trial. Her viral load was undetectable and her health was good. This
was the only way that she could get treated for HIV. 156
TRIPs has a number of rules which limit the rights of patent holders in certain
circumstances. As we have already seen, some of them are found in Article 31, which
allows for other uses of a patented invention without the authorisation of the patentee
where the law of the relevant member state so permits if a number of conditions are
154 Frank, Wooldbridge. Analysis: Affordable Medicines-TRiPs and United States Policies,[2000]I , I.P.Q
p, 2.
155 Ibid, p. I





















complied with. These 'other uses' include compulsory licenc.es which can be taken
advantage of 'in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances for extreme
urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use' 157. Another rule is found in Article
6 which permits parallel importing. Parallel importing is when a country imports a
patented drug from another country where it is sold for less than the price found in the
importing country.
In an attempt to find a cheaper means of obtaining drugs South Africa took advantage
of these two provisions the South African government made legislative changes to its
patent laws. In 1997 it amended section 15c of the South African Medicines and
Related Substances Control Act 1965. The amended section allowed compulsory
licensing and parallel trading and is embodied in Article 10 of the South African
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 1997. When the
proposals to pass this Act were made public, the United States government, The
Pharmaceutical Manufactures Association and 40 pharmaceutical companies
including Glaxo - Welcome and Smithe Kline Beecham (the plaintiffs), brought an
action against South Africa. The case was titled The Pharmaceutical Manufacturer 's
Association of South Africa and Others V The President of the Republic of South
AMcal 58 and was lodged in South African courts. The plaintiffs claim was that the
provisions in article 10 of the 1997 act were unconstitutional and violated certain
provisions of the TRIPs agreement. More specifically the plaintiffs argued that sec
15c 'violates article 27 and 28 of TRIPs and does not seem to have paid sufficient
IS7 Article 31( b) of TRIPs
I S8 The High Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division) , Case number 4183/98
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'attention to article 6 and 31 thereof.'159. The case 'provoked hysterical claims on both
sides with drug companies accusing the government of patent piracy and AIDS
. . . h d fj f id ,160activists accusing t e rug irms 0 genoci e
After many deliberations and a three-year case, the multinational companies dropped
the case in April 2001. It is clear that massive pressure from an outraged international
public was the reason why the case was dropped.l'" As such compulsory licensing and
parallel importing of essential unaffordable drugs is permitted under South African
law. The outcome of this dispute has great implications but before we go into that it is
important for us to look into some of the arguments put forward by both sides. This
dispute is a good illustration of TRIPs at work. It presents us with a good opportunity
to examine the various provisions in TRIPs, which allow restrictions on intellectual
property rights. . These provisions are of particular importance to developing
countries.
159 Frank, Wooldbridge . Analysis: Affordable lvledicines-TRlPs and United States Policies .[2000] 1, LP.Q, p6
160 The economist print edition , A war over drugs and patents), March 8th 2001, obtained form
www.theeconomist.com. p.2
161 There were numerous letters and editorials written across the glob condemning the plaintiffs. John
Grimond, condemned the plaintiffs actions and termed them as modem barbarism. See John Grimond,





















4.2 The 1997Act and its criticisms
'If drug companies call compulsory licensing theft, then we will call AIDS
profiteering murder'
Zackie Achmat, Hearings on HIVIAIDS Treatment Access at the South African
Parliament 9 and 10, http://www.tac.org.zalparlhear.txt
What is interesting about South Africa is that although it is a developing country, it
had strong patent laws even before TRIPs. These laws were put in place during the
apartheid era and were meant to protect inventions made by the white minority. As
indicated above the amended section is section 15 c of the Medicines and Related
Substances Control Act 1965.
The Section is sub headed "measures to ensure supply of more affordable medicines"
and provides that;
"The Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable
medicines in certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the public, and in
particular may--
(a) not withstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Patents Act 1978
(Act No. 57 of 1978) determine that the rights with regard to any medicine under a
patent granted in the Republic shall not extend in relation to acts in respect of such
medicine which has been put on the market by the owner of the medicine or with his
or her consent;
(b) prescribe the conditions on which any medicine which is identical in
composition, meets the same quality standard and is intended to have the same





which is imported by a person other than the person who is the holder of the
registration certificate of the medicine already registered and which originates from
any site of manufacture of the original manufacturer as approved by the council in the
prescribed manner, may be imported
(c) prescribe the registration procedure for, as well as the use of the medicine
referred to in paragraph (b)."
The plaintiffs claimed that the provision gave broad unspecified powers to the South
African Minister of Health. A closer look at the wording in the first sentence of the
provision shows the origin of this claim, which may be true. However the claim that
the health minister 'would be able to grab patented ideas without proper legal
authority' , seems to be rather far fetched as the 1997 Act would be a legal document
passed under the proper law of an independent state .
A much more credible argument was that the patent holders rights would be taken
away from them without adequate compensation. The 1997 Act does not cover
compulsory licensing to the detailed extent required by Article 31 of TRIPs. The
article prescribes certain strict conditions which the statute of a member states
permitting compulsory licensing. One of the conditions is that 'the right holder shall
be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account
the economic value of the authorization'P'' The South African Act does not seem to
give the right holder any compensation and the plaintiffs were perturbed about this.

















South Africa defended itself on this point on by indicating that 'the requirement of
just and equitable compensation is derived form Article 25 of the South African
Constitution, which guarantees property rights ,163. As such any right holders whose
products were compulsorily licensed would be compensated by decree of the South
African Constitution.
,
Article 31 also indicates that the statute of a member state shall also have regard to the
fact that any use shall be non-exclusive, non-assignable and ' shall be liable to be
terminated if and when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist' 164. An
examination of the amended section does not reveal any attempt to prohibit
compulsory licensing that does not comply with these three conditions. This caused
further consternation to the plaintiffs. A further bone of contention originated from
Article 32 of the TRIPs Agreement, which states that there shall be a judicial review
facility available, i.e. an appeal, for any decision to revoke or forfeit a patent. The
amended Act provides no legal basis for ajudicial review.
So South Africa was criticised for directly contradicting its duties under TRIPs by not
complying with Article 31 and 32. It was also attacked because of parallel licensing.
The plaintiffs argued that although parallel importation of copyrighted goods is lawful
under most countries legislations including the United States , it was ' inappropriate to
apply the doctrine of exhaustion to patents' 165. In some jurisdictions, once a right
163 Frank, Wooldbridge. Analysis: Affordable Medicines-TRiPs and United States Policies,[2000] 1,I.P.Q, pg
103-111
164 Dr Peter , L. Kolke r. TRiPs Agreement Patent Protection, Pg 30









holder sells or exposes his goods to a market he is said to have exhausted his
intellectual property rights and his goods can be exported to other countries without
his permission and sold at a cheaper prices. This is termed as the doctrine of
exhaustion of patents.
The issue of parallel importing was one of the most contentious issues in the TRIPs
Agreement. This is because the economies of developing countries such as Hong
Kong and Singapore depend to a great extend on parallel exporting. For parallel
trading to occur the Intellectual Property rights have to be exhaustible. Exhaustion of
rights would mean that once a product is out on the market in one WTO member, the
owner of the intellectual property right on this same product in another WTO
member, would not be able to prevent the importation of that product into that other
member and subsequent marketing there. 'From the right holder's point of view, this
doctrine would be a severe, almost devastating problem. It would undermine the
interests of the holder of the intellectual property right who sought to market his
product internationally' 166. It is for these reasons that the developed countries whose
citizens would be the holders of most intellectual property rights did not want the
introduction of parallel trading and international exhaustion of rights.
As this issue was so hotly contested in the negotiations leading to TRIPs, it is no
surprise that there are divergent views as to whether or not TRIPs prohibits parallel
importation or international exhaustion of intellectual property rights. Article 6 of










TRIPs does not prohibit members from following their national laws on the question
of parallel imports or exhaustion of intellectual property rights as long as national
treatment and most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment are accorded. The article goes
on to say that 'nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the subject of
exhaustion of intellectual property rights ' 167. Some authors, such as Weismann, argue
that a simple reading of Article 6 indicates that member countries are not prohibited
from practising parallel trading and exhaustion of rights.
On the other hand others l68 argue that Article 6 removes the subject of parallel
importing from the jurisdiction of the dispute settlement process. This argument goes
on to say that TRIPs has different provisions on parallel importing for different
intellectual property rights and does not commit itself to either condemning or
permitting parallel importing as a whole. In the case of patents, it has been argued that
'notwithstanding the footnote to Article 28, the substantive provision, allowing the
right to exclude third parties from the right of importation, along with that prohibiting
any discrimination on grounds of whether the product is imported or domestically
produced, sets out an obligation prohibiting parallel imports.' 169 Therefore it is
arguable whether parallel trading and international exhaustion of intellectual property
rights is compatible with TRIPs. This uncertainty as to whether or not TRIPs prohibits
parallel trading has been identified, by Weismann.l/'' as one of the loopholes in TRIPs
which developing countries can take advantage of. Given this situation, the parallel
167 TRIPs article 6
168 Strauss, TRIPs and Patent Law, in Beier and Schriker (eds .), From GATT to TRIPS - The Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects 0/Intellectual Property rights.
169 1. Watal, The TRIPs Agreement and Developing Countries, p. 283
170 R, Weismann, A Long Strange Trips: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global
Intellectual Property Rules and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third-World Countries,
University of Pennsylvania Journal ofInternational Economic Law , Winter 1996, Vol. 17, pp . 1069- 1125,

















importing provisions in the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment
Act 1997 mayor may not be compatible with the TRIPs agreement and only a
detailed interpretation of Article 6 and Article 28 will be able to settle the matter.
The plaintiffs in the South African dispute feared that if the drugs were compulsorily
licensed in South Africa they would be exported to developed countries and to the
more lucrative private market in South Africa at very cheap prices .. In an indirect
support to of the plaintiffs point, 'the view is adopted in paragraph 71 of the Report of
the House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee "Trade Marks, Fakes and
Consumers", H.C. 380, that the nature of the pharmaceutical market means that any
move towards international exhaustion of intellectual property rights would have
severe consequences. It would prevent pharmaceutical companies from selling
products at low prices to third world countries for fear of their re-importation into
developed countries where prices were higher,Ul. Frank 172 suggests a solution to this
problem by suggesting that ' if AIDS medicines are compulsorily licensed in South
Africa (or in any of the developing countries for that matter) there is some ground for
thinking that the exportation of such medicines ought to be prohibited ' 173. The other
way of thinking about this 'problem' is for the plaintiffs to realise that the rich
minority in South Africa or any other country that is developing is purely a minority
and if this minority does have access to the cheaper drugs the profits that the
companies may have made from selling the drugs at their high market prices is really
negligible.
I7I Frank, Wooldbridge. Analysis: Affordable Medicines-TRiPs and United States Policies.[2000] I, LP.Q p. 6




Had this case come to full trial South Africa may have been forced to change some of
the most important provisions in the Medicines and Related Substances Control
Amendment Act 1997. Although South Africa claims that the Act is compatible with
TRlPs there are a few areas where this seems to be a falsity. However, as the case
ended prematurely South Africa has been given the go ahead by the international
community to implement a law that may not be compatible with TRlPs. The outcome
of the dispute has many important implications.
4.3 The consequences ofthe outcome ofthe dispute
Parallel importing will allow South Africa to import desperately needed
medicines from countries where they wer~ available for far less-than a drug
company would charge in South Africa. Compulsory licensing will reduce the
price of drugs by as much as 90 percent'
L.J.Davis, A Deadly Dearth ofDrugs, Mother Jones, January 2000
The first and direct impact of the passing of the Medicines and Related Substances
Control Amendment Act 1997 will be that cheap drugs will be available for South
Africa patients who previously could not afford them. These are not necessarily only
AIDS drugs but also any drugs which are needed in 'certain circumstances so as to
77
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protect the health of the public ' 174. This will include drugs for serious conditions such
as cancer or even malaria.. An important example is Ceftriaxone. This drug is needed
for the treatment of severe infections such as pneumonia or septicaemia. 'The South
Africa trade price per Img vial of Roche 's Rocephin (cefttriaxone) is R136 .18 while
the Rocephin trade price in Spain is R85.24 (1.6 times cheaper) .175
Harvey Bale the head of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturer's Associations was worried about the precedent that a defeat for the
drug companies in a South Africa court would set176• His fears that other countries
which may have profitable markets among their rich minority will follow the lead and
alter their patent legislation has come true with a number of developing countries
following South Africa's lead and amending their laws to allow for compulsory
licensing and parallel importing ofdrugs which their citizens need and cannot afford.
In the case of Brazil, Harvey Bale's fears had become a reality long before he made
them public. Brazil had actually amended Article 68 of its Patents Act 1968 in
1999.This amendment was almost identical to the South African Amendment. Article
68 allows the Brazilian government to grant compulsory licences in matters of
national emergency and other special circumstances waiving the patents rights in
order to get . The United States lodged a trade dispute with the WTO in Geneva in
June 2000 c1aming that Article 68 of Brazil 's patent law breached the rules in the
TRIPs Agreement. 'The dispute had become a symbol of perceived intimidation by
174 Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 1997 sc 15c
175 Affidavit of Carmen Perez-Casas ,(fn 92), p.7






















the US and Pharmaceutical multinationals against developing countries that sought to
obtain cheaper and wider access to essential medicines ,l77. On the 25th of June, 2001
the United States withdraw this dispute while Brazil pledged to consult with
American companies before it applied compulsory licenses against them. The
withdrawal of this dispute by the United States is most probably a direct consequence
of its 'defeat' by South Africa just a month before. Public outrage surrounding the
dispute with Brazil is also a reason for the withdrawal.
Malawi is making plans to adopt new patent laws permitting compulsory 'licensing
and parallel importing. In Malawi 'only 30 persons out of 800,000 HIV -positive
individuals currently receive anti-retroviral drugs ,178 .It may be predicted that almost
all developing countries will soon introduce Acts which are identical to the South
African and Brazilian ones in the next few months. Most people in these countries
simply cannot afford the drugs they need to survive, 'The crisis of disease facing
developing countries is dire. Every year malaria, tuberculosis and AIDS kill around 6
million people, almost all of them from developing world ' 179. Africa makes up 75% of
what is termed as the developing countries. The continent accounts for around 80
percent of all HIV-infections in low income or high prevalencel '" countries. At the
end of 1999, The United Nations Agency on AIDS (UNAIDS) estimated that 24.5
million of Sub - Saharan Africans were living with AIDS , There are roughly 5
million more HIV-positive individuals in other developing countries , outside of
171 Peter Capella , Brazil wins HI V drug concessionfrom US, The Guardian Tuesday June 26 th 2001,
htlp://www.guardian.co.uk/aids/story/o,7369 ,512651,00.html
178 Harvard University, (fn 149), pg 7
179 M.Moore, Countries must f eel secure that they can use TRIPs 'flexib ility, www.wto .wnv'english/new-
e/newsOl-eldg-trips-medicines-o 18620.e.htm, p.1
180 See the United Nations Agency for AIDS report 1999 .Low-incom e countries are countries with an
income of <$755 per year while high prevalence countries are countries with > 2% of adults infected . ,
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Africa. l s l 'In addition to tremendous human suffering the pandemic has become a
major cause of social, political and economic instability.' [S2 Africa will not pay for
the expensive drugs that are available and will simply implement laws that allow
compulsory licensing and parallel trading
Kenya introduced just such an Act in June 2001. The Industrial Property Act 2001 is
the Act in question and was implemented in Kenya mainly to comply with the
requirements of the TRIPs Agreement. Having granted patent rights to an invention
which is 'new, involves an inventive step and is industrially applicablel'", the Act
allows for parallel trading and international exhaustion in section 58 (2) which reads;
'the rights under the patent shall not extend to acts in respect of articles which have
been put on the market in Kenya or in any other country or imported into Kenya by
the owner of the patent or with his express consent'. Section 58 (5) of the 'act allows
for compulsory licensing by indicating that 'the rights under the Act shall be limited
by the provisions on compulsory licences for reasons of public interest'. The reasons
for introducing these provisions were identical to the ones in South Africa; 'to allow
for cheaper medicines which are required for human life, especially on the HIV/AIDS
and the ones the doctors call opportunistic diseases, as well as malaria.' IS4. 2.2 million
Kenyans are afflicted with AIDS. The disease was declared to be a national
emergency in 1999.
181 These include 4.7 million in India, South and Southeast Asia (of which 3.7 million are in India) and
around 350,000 in the western Hemisphere (mainly Haiti and the Dominican Republic
182 Harvard University, (fnI49) p. I
183 The Industrial Property Act Sec 22

















In much the same way as the South Africa Act the Kenyan Act does not mention
remuneration of the affected right holder, it is not clear whether the compulsory
licences will be non-exclusive and non-assignable and there is no sign of a provision
for allowing judicial review if a patent is compulsory licensed. There seems therefore,
to be evidence that The Industrial Property Bill 2001 does not comply with the
provisions in TRIPs. However the affected pharmaceutical companies have said
nothing and will probably not say anything. The effect of the South Africa dispute
was literally to silence them. The fact that these parliamentary Acts of South African
and Kenya are not TRIPs compliant does not seem to be bothering the WTO either.
The Director -General of WTO welcomed the end of the South African dispute by
sating that, the dispute clearly shows TRIPs should be as a means rather than a
hindrance of ensuring that cheap drugs find their way to the developing countries.
Perhaps he should at the same time heed the demands currently being made by
developing countries to make the compulsory licensing provisions in TRIPs less strict
and converge a group of negotiators for this very purpose.
The compulsory licensing provisions in TRIPs are considered by developing countries
to be too strict. They are certainly stricter than they are under the Paris convention.185
It is has been claimed by some writers that the one set of provisions which USA was
relentless about was the compulsory licensing provisions. Penrose indicates that
'Article 31 was practically written by the United States International Trade
Commission '186 and that they were put in place predominantly to stop what the
developed countries considered to be abuses of compulsory licences by developing
185 1. Watal, (fn 17) p.288 .










countries. Cornish187 indicates that compulsory licensing was an obsession of
developing countries particularly when patented technology was not being used In
domestic production. The USA was determined to put a stop to this obsession by
introducing very strict conditions to compulsory licensing despite the fact that it had
relied on compulsory licences in its second stage of development, 188
Developing countries have asked for the relaxation of the compulsory licensing
conditions found in Article 31189. The particularly contested one is section 31(h) on
remuneration. It is difficult to see where developing countries are going to get money
from their over stretched budgets to pay for remuneration in order, in most cases, to
give their citizens a chance to live. The entire situation looks unfair and unbalanced.
Perhaps in cases of national emergency, such as the AIDS catastrophe, this
remuneration should be waived. The same should apply to the requirement ofjudicial
review 190. Dr Peter L Kolker insists on the importance of judicial review where a
compulsory license measure has been put in place by stating that' a patent is a piece
of property and any taking away of that property should be subject to a proper appeal
procedure.' 191. This is fair enough but this appeal procedure could be time consuming
and in emergency situations the saving of time is crucial. The other recommendation
is that parallel importing provisions should be made clear with parallel trading and
international exhaustion of rights being encouraged where and when it is necessary.
187 W.R. Cornish (fn 9) pp. 46-63.
188 Kirchanski: Protection a/United States Patent Rights in Developing Countries: United States
Efforts to Enforce Pharmaceutical Patents in Thai/and. [1994] 16 Loyola LA International and Comparative
Law Journal. pp. 536-591.
189 www.wto.org/engltratop-e/trips-e/factsheel. P.6
I ~'O Article 32 of TRIPs













The case of The Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Association of South Africa and
Others V The President ofthe Republic ofSouth Africal 92 is really a conflict between
a developing country and the industrialized countries over the compulsory licensing
provisions in TRIPs. 'Although article 31 is the main issue in the case, the dispute 'is
an early warning shot in a much larger struggle over access to the fruits of
knowledge' 193. It is suggested here that, the greatest effect of the outcome of this
dispute will be to encourage developing countries to introduce legislations, which are
contrary to TRIPs in other areas of intellectual property in an effort to acquire
information, science and technology. These three components are indispensable for a
country which wishes to develop. If trade sanctions are threatened on the
implementation of these legislations, public outrage may win the day' as happened in
South Africa. In this way the provisions in TRIPs which most adversely affect
developing countries will slowly but surely become overlooked and eventually
hopefully amended.
192 The High Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division), Case number 4183/98







The current order continues to accentuate poverty in the developing
countries .. .. Developed Countries are continually manipulating international
systems to their benefit yet purporting to be democratic
Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe, Speaking at a meeting of the non-
aligned nations in Caracas 27 November 1991.194
The TRIPs Agreement is one of the most controversial agreements of our time with
the developed countries and developing countries wanting completely opposite
outcomes. In the first place developing countries did not want the Agreement to be
passed. It was their conviction that the already existing Paris and Berne Conventions
provided adequate international intellectual property protection. On the other hand the
industrialized countries led by the United States, were determined to ratify the TRIPs
Agreement in order to protect some of their industries which were suffering great
losses due to the widespread piracy, copying and free riding taking place mainly in
developing countries. 'The US took an unrelenting position in TRIPs negotiations -
the rest of the world would have to adopt U.S style intellectual property protection.
U.S style patent protection means a strict patent regime with a long patent term for
process and product patents and no compulsory licensing'!"
194 Cited in Deepa Ollapall y. . The South Looks North: The Third World on the New World order ', April
1993 Current History 175.
195 E. Henderson, (fnll ), p.2
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Having TRIPs under the auspices of GAIT would mean that there would be an
effective enforcement mechanism which did not exist under WIPO. However Dr
Sodipol96 warns against having too high an expectation on the efficacy of the
enforcement of rights in those countries where an intellectual property tradition is yet
to develop. When a country has not reached Krishanki 'sl97 third stage of
development, introducing greater protection of intellectual property rights will be
more disadvantageous than advantageous. The pharmaceutical industry is of
particular importance as far as international intellectual property is concerned.
Developed countries are determined to have patents in order to benefit their
pharmaceutical industries while developing countries want to have as little protection
as possible so as to provide their citizens with life saving drugs and to maintain public
health.
The full and true impact of the TRIPs agreement on the pharmaceutical industry will
be felt in most developing countries only after 2005 when the transitional periods
allowed for them to implement the agreement under Part VI of TRIPs expires.!"
There is great uncertainty (and anxiety) as to the actual impact of TRIPs on
developing countries. There are a number of possible scenarios for the future . Despite
the presence of competition in the pharmaceutical industry the effect of TRIPs will be
that prices for pharmaceutical products will increase in developing countries. No
matter how much the pharmaceutical companies claim that they take into
196 B. Sodipo, (fn 20).
197 A. Damato, (fn 8 )
198The effects of the Agreement will not be very different from one LDC to another. However there
may be variations as far as the extent of the effects is concerned between MDCs and LDCs.
This is because these two categories of the developing countries are in different stages of development.





consideration the low levels of income in developing countries or offer to bring down
the prices, the patented drug prices will never be as cheap as they would have been
~
had the drugs been reverse engineered and produced locally or imported from generic
drug companies such as the Indian ones. It is true that the high drug prices should not
be seen as a disadvantage when balanced with the benefit that the people of the world
will receive by having more new pharmaceuticals than they would otherwise have,
due to the increased research that patent protection encourages. However this
argument ignores the fact that new pharmaceuticals are of no use to the poor people of
developing countries if they cannot afford them.
Article 27 of TRIPs encourages the non-working of patented products locally. This
means that there will be little or no technological transfer not only in the
pharmaceutical industries, but across the board in all industries where patents are
required for protection. This seems to contradict Article 7 where technologic transfer
is cited as one of the objective of TRIPs. However, despite non- encouragement of
local working of patents, the pharmaceutical industry may be one of the industries
which will attract, technological transfer, local R&D and its attendant investment, in
the long run. This is evidenced by the studies of countries such as China which
experienced increased R&D once patents were introduced in the pharmaceutical
industry. Developing countries have indicated that they would rather bring about
R&D through other means such as Government funding and awards. These other
means are not as effective as the granting of patent. If R&D is the actual outcome of
implementing TRIPs then developing countries will benefit immensely not only from

















in the new R&D companies. In addition to this, drugs for diseases which are akin to
the developing countries will be developed.
v
Due to competition in the pharmaceutical industry, it may be that patents will not
necessarily make drugs more expensive. However, the drugs may still be expensive
despite the competition because of the low level of income in developing countries.
The solution here lies in differential pricing which the WT0199 indicates is compatible
with TRIPs. On the other hand, if a drug is completely new with no close substitutes,
it will be extremely expensive and differential pricing may not even be able to bring
the price down low enough for people in developing countries to afford it. . In such a
case the solution may be found in compulsory licensing . However TRIPs does not
allow for compulsory licensing where a drug is too expensive. Developing countries
want Article 31 of TRIPs to be amended such that compulsory licensing of
pharmaceutical products is not prohibited when a drug is simply too expensive for
their citizens to afford.
Over and above all this, it is hoped that manufacturing companies will be reasonable
in setting prices and helping in R&D in developing countries. As we have seen,
increased intellectual property rights through TRIPs are important and may even
benefit developing countries in the long run. This is particularl y so in that it stops
outright piracy and may bring about technological transfer. Thus the solution to the
199 The uncert ainty of this must again be stressed. The true effects of TRIPs in developi ng countries will only
be known some years after 2005.
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difficulties of developing countries in getting cheap drugs is not to decrease
intellectual property rights or patents altogether. The solution lies in sensitising
intellectual property right holders in the pharmaceutical industry towards the problem
of access to drugs in developing countries. It is hoped that this will encourage them
not to demand for the enforcement of increased intellectual property protection in
developing countries .We live in a civilised world where human suffering cannot be
ignored while profits of big pharmaceutical companies are protected ..
In India in addition to an increase in pharmaceutical prices, the local generic industry
may will not be as lucrative as it has been in the past. 'As the pharmaceutical industry
in India increasingly becomes patent based as opposed to generic based, foreign
corporations will gain an immediate edge because they own the majority of
pharmaceutical patents,200. All the provisions in the Patent Act 1970 which allowed
the Indian generic industry to thrive will be replaced by the provisions in the TRIPs
Agreement, which will lead to the inevitable collapse of a huge part of the industry.
Product patents will be available for all industries without discrimination. Both
product and process patents will have a twenty year term as opposed to the previous
fourteen and seven year terms respectively. The discretion of the Indian Government
to grant compulsory licenses will be drastically limited. However the generic industry
may still be able to operate in limited manner. This is because it will be legal to
generically produce the many drugs that had outlived a 20-year patent period before
1994.





There is the possibility that the generic industry in India will develop into a research-
based industry. Local scientists will be encouraged to invent and they may be
persuaded into staying in the country rather than immigrating abroad in search of
more promising environments of work. Thus, India will be able to make use of its
wealth of well-trained scientiststo research and manufacture its own drugs instead of
copying the work of others. The new research oriented industry will be a good source
of cheaper drugs for its own people . India has all the resources and infrastructure
required for such an industry. There is already evidence of the presence of such an
industry with the innovative work being done by Dr Anji Reddy's company.
The outcome of the dispute in South Africa has a number of important implications.
Firstly, it may encourage developing countries to introduce legislations challenging
the particular provisions in TRIPs which are most disadvantageous to their countries.
This may eventually lead to the revision of this provisions as may happen with the
compulsory licensing provisions which were at the center of the South African
dispute. Secondly, there is every reason to believe that other developing countries
will imitate South Africa in enforcing legislations which allow for compulsory
licensing under conditions that are more relaxed than those found in Article 31 of
.
TRIPs. These legislations will also permit parallel importation and international
exhaustion of rights under certain circumstances. Brazil implemented such legislation




Thirdly, the dispute in South Africa illustrates that the compulsory licensing
provisions in TRIPs are too strict .for developing countries to use effectively under
emergency conditions. There is an urgent need for a revision of the compulsory
licensing provisions in TRIPs and a clear statement as to the legality of parallel
importing'?" . It is advocated here that parall el importing and international exhaustion
of rights should be encouraged in emergency situations. Developing countries can
only get cheap drugs for its dying people only through bold legislations where the
countries expose themselves to bilateral actions from the countries such as the USA
202. Brazil and South Africa succeed in providing their citizens with more affordable
drugs only by putting their countries' economies at risk . The very daring legislations
and national policies that they wished to implement may have earned them trade
sanctions had the international community remained silent, as it has sometimes done.
The amending of Article 31 making it less strict, at least as far as pharmaceutical
drugs are concerned, would send a clear message to developed countries that in some
case s, they have to share their intellectual property with the developing countries
without making profits purely for humanitarian concerns. Time and time again the
WTO secretarial has argued that 'TRIPS strikes a carefully negotiated balance
between providing intellectual property protection and allowing countries the
flexibility to ensure that treatments reach the world's poorest and most vulnerable
20 1 Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) asked the European Commission to allow for and advocate a wide scope
of interpretation ofArticle 31 and support fast track adminis trative compulsory licensing procedures. See,
Campaign for Access to Essentia l Medic ines, Recommendations to the European/or discussions at the June
2001 TRIPs Council on Health and Access to Medicines Commission,
http//195 .114.67.76/msf/accessmed/acc.. .I4DTSR2.
202 The USA succeeded in making Thailand abandoned its attempts to implement laws allowing for cheaper
drugs . See McGrath (fn 122).
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people,203 This assertion will be much more evident if the compulsory licensing
provisions are made less strict. It is suggested here that in particular the conditions of
judicial review and remuneration should be ignored in emergency cases. Parallel
importing and exhaustion of rights should be automatic where drugs are required and
cannot be afforded .If these recommendations are put in place, developing countries
do not have to go through a long, arduous and expensive court case before the
implementation of such important legislations, such as the Medicines and Related
Substances Control Amendment Act 1997.
The case of India is a perfect example of a developing country which had very weak
intellectual property protection laws and now due to TRIPs will be forced to change
these laws. South Africa contracts to India because before TRIPs it had laws granting
very strong intellectual property rights and now after TRIPs it has implemented a
legislation going directly against the provisions in TRIPs and granting less intellectual
property rights than before. India is most reluctant to change its old weak patent laws
evidenced by the fact that even now, six years after the signing of TRIPs, it has not
yet implemented TRIPs. Even when it does so it may very well apply a less stricter
version of the compulsory licensing laws in TRIPs Gust as South Africa has done) in
an effort to find AIDS drugs for its 4.7 million AIDS patients204. South Africa has
moved into a form of weak patent law and India may well follow' suit. This is a
phenomenon that will certainly be repeated in most developing countries showing
clearly that developing countries do not want and will not have strict patent laws
practically in the pharmaceutical industry.
203 M.Moore, (fn 179) p. 1
204 UNAID, (fn 180)
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It is appreciated that developed countries have to protect their interests by
strengthening intellectual property rights . However this strengthening of rights may
lead to considerable disadvantages in developing countries. 'The current task is to
reach beyond national boundaries, as technology has done , and attempt to create
relationships which acknowledge both the property rights of owners as well as the
legitimate need of developing economies to access information and maintain low drug
. .
prices. It is hoped that these relations will help developing countries to join the global
economy'f'" . These relations may emerge if developed countries take up the call of
the UN to assist developing countries in matters of international intellectual property
206 . The UN suggests that it will be in the interests of developed countries to help
developing countries in the implementation of TRIPs 'through technical and financial
support as stipulated in the Agreement' . The UN provides what it terms as an 'non-
exhaustive' list of what the developed countries can do to help in the implementation
of TRIPs. These include:
'. Assisting countries to understand the options, costs, opportunities and challenges
arising from the TRIPs Agreement
• Preparing them for the various stages of implementation of the Agreement,
including the provision of training
o Collaborating in the dissemination of information on laws and regulations
concerning transfer if technology








Over and above this help from developed countries, developing countries need to
realise that they have to look within themselves for ways and means of achieving
development, such that an Agreement like TRIPs does not cause such major
problems. There is a great deal of corruption in developing countries and it is the
main reason for their under-development. These countries need to work on their
internal systems instead of always waiting upon aid from developed countries in
order to develop. The meeting held in Abuja, Nigeria by leaders of 44 African
Countries 207to discuss the ways and means African countries could help each other.
find cheap pharmaceutical products is a welcome move . If such cooperation
continues and the rest of the world assists in any way it can, the TRIPs Agreement
may well turn out to be a means of development for developing countries as
opposed to a hindrance to development.
A climate of cooperation and understanding between developed and developing
countries is crucial in the long-term implementation and application ofTRIPs.
Developing countries need to understand that increased patent protection is
necessary to protect the industries of developed countries and may benefit them in
the long run. Developed countries have to be made aware of the adverse problems
that TRIPs may create in developing countries. These countries have to be
sensitised enough to do whatever is in their power to alleviate any problems
developing countries may suffer over the implementation of the Agreement even if
207 The meting was held on the 26th and 27 th of April . The leaders showed their determination to face the
fight against AIDS and other infections by declaring to raise substantially the health budgets in their
respective countries among other decisions. See Eugene. Agboifo, Africa needs other changes, Aceprensa





it means a relaxation of intellectual property protection. An atmosphere of
compromise is necessary. In this way the 'north - south divide' will hopefully
become the 'north-south cooperation' with the TRlPs Agreement being a means for
all countries of the WTO to gain technological transfer and advance economically.
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South Africa- The Medicines and Related Substances Act 1999
India - The Patents Act 1970
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